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The Housing Act of 1937, as amended,' sets forth a federal
policy "to remedy the unsafe and insanitary housing conditions and
the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for
families of low income. . . [by vesting] in the local public housing
agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the
administration of the low-rent housing program . . . ."I "Low-
rent housing" is defined as "safe, and sanitary dwellings within the
financial reach of families of low income . . . . -3 This survey
'42 U.S.C. § 1401-30 (1964). as amended. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-22 (Supp. 1968).
I id. § 1401.
3 Id. § 1402(I).
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examines the management policies of public housing projects
presently in operation under the Act,4 determines the extent to
which these projects are accomplishing the stated purposes of the
federal housing program and related anti-poverty programs, and
explores the remedies available to the Government and the public
housing tenant to force compliance with these purposes.
It is not the purpose of this study to delve into the myriad of
factors which have caused the acute shortage of decent low-rent
public housing in this countryY Instead, this undertaking is limited
to an evaluation of existing projects-the problems in project
management, such as the* extreme dilapidation of older sites,
peculiar to particular types of projects, as well as the generally
more prevalent problems of misrhanagement, funding, repair, social
services, and tenant eligibility.
I. SUB-STANDARD PUBLIC HOUSING
The declared purpose of the Housing Act was to provide low
income families with "decent, safe and sanitary dwellings."
However, projects constructed in the early stages of public housing
as well as more recent structures have fallen into varying states of
disrepair ranging from grossly dilapidated projects which can be
classified "public housing slums" 8 to projects which, although not
in advanced stages cf deterioration, are not properly maintained.
Tenants cite incompetent and unsympathetic management as the
cause of public housing deterioration 7 while public housing
'The locally owned and federally supported public housing program authorized by the
1937 Act has been implemented in every state, and the great majority of public housing units
are encompassed by it. See Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview. 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 642, 642-43 n.7 (1966); Note, Remedies Jbr Tenants in Substandard Public Housing.
68 COLUM. L. REV. 561 n.3 (1968). Under this program Local Authorities build, own and
operate low-rent public housing as public corporations under state enabling legislation.
Loans and annual "Contributions" (subsidies) are provided by the federal government to aid
in paying the interest and amortization of bonds sold by the Local Authorities to finance
construction. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-10 (1964); Friedman, supra, at 648; 68 COLUM. L.
REv., supra, at 561.
- The 1960 census indicated that 10.6 million of the available 58.3 million housing units
in the U.S. were substandard. See Davis, Cooperative Self-Help Housing. 32 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 409 (1967).
'See H. SALISBURY. THE SHOOK-UP GENERATION 74 (1958); Friedman, supra note 4, at
644; Mulvihill, Problents in the Management of Public Housing. 35 TE.NiP. L.Q. 163, 179
(1962); 68 COLUm. L. REV., supra note 4.
7 See. e.g.. NAT'L Assoc. OF HOUSING & REDEVELOPMENT OFFICIALS, PUBLIC HOUSING
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authorities point to increasing costs of labor and materials,8
decreased revenues from project operation, and excessive misuse of
the units as reasons for their failure to repair. Yet, Housing
Assistance Administration (HAA) officials and local management,
at least until recently, have placed a major emphasis upon
producing high residual receipts to reduce federal contributions and
have not plowed income back into maintenance programs. 0 All
these elements contribute to the problem, but principal blame can
be placed on two factors: first, a manifest lack of clearly defined
guidelines and, second, inadqequate provisions for financing the
badly needed repairs and maintenance.
The Statutory Framework
The Housing Act is silent as to any specific program or
procedure for maintenance and rehabilitation of public housing,
stating merely that the purpose of the legislation is to provide
housing (for the poor) in a decent, safe and sanitary condition,"
and that the annual contributions from the HAA to the Local
Authority are "to assist in achieving and maintaining the low-rent
character of their housing projects."' 2  State enabling legislation
also mentions the goal of providing low-rent, safe and decent
housing for persons of low income and most enabling acts
specifically apply local housing codes to the project. 3
The Annual Contributions Contract (ACC) between the federal
government and the Local Authority emphasizes the construction
Is THE TENANTS 23 (Changing Concepts of the Tenant-Management Relationship, Issue IIf,
Feb. 1967) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC HOUSING IS THE TENANTS].
'A related problem is featherbedding-unions demand that electricians replace light bulbs
and that carpenters replace screws in brackets. Ledbetter, Public Housing-A Social
Experiment Seeks Acceptance. 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 490. 509 (1967). Rigged bidding
and bribery are also costly. Id.; N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1966. at I, col. 8.
1 In New York City, vandalism may cost as much as $40,000 per project annually.
Mulvihill. supra note 6, at 179. Much-needed funds for renovation are expended to improve
lighting, install unbreakable fixtures and enclose light bulbs to prevent vandalism. Ledbetter,
supra note 8. at 508; see Wall Street Journal, Sept. 26, 1966, at 18, col. 4.
,' Interview with Kenneth Cavanaugh, Deputy Director of Tenants' Services Branch,
Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, in Washington, D.C.. Oct. 29, 1968.
"42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
1242 U.S.C. § 1410 (1964).
"The Housing Assistance Administration model enabling act contains the following
provision: "All projects of an authority shall be subject to the planning, zoning, sanitary and
building laws, ordinances aid regulations applicable to the locality in which the project is
situated." HOUSING ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION. DRAFT ENABLING ACT § 15 (1965).
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and maintenance of decent housing quarters. Section 213 of the
Contract requires the Local Authority to maintain the property in
good repair and to restore housing units destroyed by certain
casualties.'4 Moreover, if the Local Authority has not met its
maintenance obligations, the federal government may then seek
several remedies through the HAA, the administrator of the federal
program.
The HAA has the right to reduce or terminate annual
contributions payable under the ACC upon breach of the condition
that requires preservation of "each Project in good repair, order,
and condition."' 5 Upon the occurrence of certain contractual
defaults the HAA can require the Local Authority to convey title
or deliver possession of the project to the Agency. If a "substantial
default"" occurs the HAA has the option of requiring either the
conveyance of title or possession of the projects; if a "substantial
breach"'7 occurs, however, the Local Authority is required to
deliver possession of the project to the HAA.18 The Local
Authority's funds may also be impounded for a substantial default
or breach 9 and the interest on HAA loans may be increased if such
a breach occurs20 In addition to these remedies HAA is empowered
to "maintain any and all actions at law or in equity against the
Local Authority to enforce the correction of [or enjoin] any...
default or breach."'" It would seem that in cases of nonfeasance in
maintenance the federal government could seek an injunction
ordering necessary repairs. Such action would also seem
appropriate in cases of inordinate delay in making repairs. One
other.remedy potentially available to the government is a writ of
mandamus. For mandamus to lie the Government must allege the
existence of a duty sought to be enforced, -a right legally
demandable from the person to whom the order must be directed,
" Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Low-Rent Public Housing Program:
Consolidated Annual Contributions Contract, Pt. II. §§ 213-14 (HUD-53010B. May 1967)
[hereinafter cited as HUD. ACC].
" Public Housing Administration, Consolidated Annual Contributions Contract, Pt. II.
§ 213 (PHA-301 I, Oct. 1957) [hereinafter cited as PHA, ACC].
" Id. §§ 501. 506.
17 Id. § 507.
"Id. § 502.
"Id. § 406(c).
242 U.S.C. § 1415(I) (1964).
" PHA. ACC. supra note 15, § 508(B).
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the respondent's power to perform the duty required, the
petitioner's clear 'ight to the relief sought, and the respondent's
refusal or failure to perform the acts sought to be enforced. The
ACC has clearly set out the Local Housing Authority's duty to
maintain and repair the premises; it appears that a breach of this
duty would be a failure to perform a ministerial non-discretionary
act, and, therefore, subject to Government enforcement by
mandamus.
All these remedies are obviously available in a situation of gross
disrepair and deterioration resulting from neglect or misfeasance on
the part of the Local Authority. Even when confronted with severe
breaches, however, the federal government is reluctant to pursue
those remedies which would result in its becoming the owner and
operator of public housing projects, and thus a number of remedies
are only theoretically available. It would also be inequitable for the
federal government to avail itself of many of these remedies when
the Local Authority's breach of a condition results merely from the
lack of funds to make needed repairs. Under such circumstances
the Government should instead institute a grant program, making
funds expressly applicable to the refinancing of improvements for
the project. 2
Federal 'Directives and Regulations
Under the Housing Act responsibility for the operation of
projects remains in the Local Housing Authority. The federal
government, however, does assist the Authority through supervisory
directives such as those published in Management Handbooks.
Some directives are mandatory;24 others are merely suggestive.
2 HUD has recently implemented a significant program to rehabilitate public housing.
See HOUSING ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT.
Low-REXT MANAGEMENT MANUAL § 1.9 (Dec. 1967, April 1968) [hereinafter cited as Low-
RENT MANAGEMENT MANUAL]; Dep't of Housing and Urban Development. Circular (Nov.
14. 1967): notes 39-43 infra and accompanying text.
-42 U.S.C. §§ 1401(11). 1404, 1409, 1410 (Supp. II, 1968).
21 HAA distinguishes between manuals, which are mandatory and specifically supplement
the provisions of the ACC. and bulletins, handbooks and booklets which may be mandatory
or merely advisory. The Low-Rent Management Manual sets out the distinction as follows:
"'This Management Manual contains PHA requirements which supplement provisions of the
Annual Contributions Contract applicable to project management. These requirements are
the minimum considered consistent with .fulfilling Federal responsibilities under the United
States Housing Act of 1937, as amended. . . . Advisory material is available in Local
[Vol. 1969: 399
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Unfortunately, rather than developing coherent programs or
guidelines to cope with deterioration and obsolescence, the chief
concerns of the directives, until recently, have been technical pro-
cedures and mechanics of repair and maintenance.
Federal officidls apparently feel that tenant complaints
concerning the absence of, or delay in, repair are better left to the
Local Authority's discretion with the Public Housing Authority
(PHA) applying only persuasion and gentle pressure. PHA's major
weapon is its program of periodic inspections of all projects with a
report and recommendation to the Authority on what action is
necessary to bring the -projects up to habitable standards,2s but
failure to act is met only by continued urgings of compliance.
Nevertheless, this system of inspections would seem to adequately
assure the proper upkeep and modernization of projects if coupled
with responsible management and adequate funding.
Financing Project Improvements
A lack of funds has perennially plagued Local Authorities and
deterred them from upgrading the physical condition of their
Housing Authority Management Handbook~s on specific subjects." Low-RENT
MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 22, § 0. (April 1962). However, the permissive
nature of the language of the Handbook[s] should not be construed as modifying any of the
requirements imposed by the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, as amended, or by the Annual
Contributions Contract." HOUSING ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT. LOCAL HOUSING AUTHORITY MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK. Pt. 1.
§ 7, 4 10. § c (Aug. 1963) [hereinafter cited as LOCAL AUTHORITY HANDBOOK].
"Circulars issued by the PHA are of two types, procedural and nonprocedural. Circulars
of a procedural nature contain requirements which have the same effect as manuals; they are
temporary additions to or modifications of the manuals pending incorporation of the
provisions into the appropriate manual, and are clearly identified as such. Other circulars are
merely informative or, if procedural, are for one time, nonrecurring use and do not affect the
manuals or other more permanent publications. The Low-Rent Housing Bulletins contain
detailed technical treatments of specific subjects and may be either (a) wholly or partially
mandatory, or.(b) wholly nonmandatory. The distinction is made clear in each bulletin or in
the reference to it in the appropriate manual." HOUSING ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION.
DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT. Low-RENT HOUSING MANUAL
§ 100.2(2)(b) & (c) (Nov. 1967).
1 PHA regulations provide for the following inspections: Management reviews, utilities
reviews, engineering surveys, occupancy audits, generalist reviews, coordinated reviews,
partial reviews of large local authorities, and special reviews. HOUSING ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT. ADMINISTRATIVE
MANUAL. Staff Procedures, Low-Rent Program Operations § 86-5-1 (June 1966). The
engineering survey is specifically applicable to the physical conditions of projects. Id. § 86-5-
6 (Aug. 1965). It is to be made every two years, but is not so held because of staff
reductions, and reallocation of workloads.
Vol. 1969: 399]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
projects.!6 Fortunately, HUD has recently committed a portion of
its development funds to a program for "modernizing" public
housing projectsY Since the serious deficiencies and inadequacies in
prior operations are the primary causes of present deterioration, an
evaluation of HUD's new program will be attempted to determine
if the more serious inadequacies in this area have been alleviated.
The main source of financing maintenance and modernization
continues to be the local project's operating income; 8 deficit
spending is permitted only when the Local Authority undertakes
the elimination of immediately serious hazards to life, health, or
safety.29
When operating income proves insufficient for proper
maintenance and repairs, further sources of funds have been quite
limited. After the payment of normal expenditures Local
Authorities are permitted to build up a reserve from operating
income for unforeseen contingencies. For projects of over 200 units
the recommended maximum reserve is one-half of the estimated
total routine expenditures as projected for the subsequent fiscal
year's budget. This reserve was originally not intended for major
rehabilitation and modernization, and even had it been designed for
such purposes, few projects experiencing dilapidation and
obsolescense are capable of building up operating reserves. On the
other hand, it would appear not only unconscionable but also in
direct contravention of the purposes of the public housing program
for an Authority to build up operating reserves and simultaneously
neglect, through lack of a modernization and rehabilitation
program, to provide "safe and sanitary dwellings [for] . . .
families of low income."'
2 As Judge Holtzhoff of the District Court for the District of Columbia pointed out in a
case dealing with a federal hospital's duty to treat mentally ill individuals, the courts
"certainly cannot mandamus Congress [to] . . . hire more personnel." Record at 409.
Rouse v. Cameron, Habeas Corpus No. 287-65 (D.D.C.. Jan. 17, 1967), rev'd. 373 F.2d 451
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
-'See PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, Low-Rent Housing Manual § 217.1 (1962);
Low-RENT MANAGEMENT MANUAL. supra note 22; Dep't of Housing and Urban
Development, Circular (Nov. 14, 1967).
2See Low-Rent Housing Manual. supra note 27, at § 217.1(5); PHA. ACC. supra note
15,§ 407.
2 See Low-RENT MANAGEMENT MANUAL. supra note 22, § 2.7(b)(1) (Mar. 96"6); PHA,
ACC, supra note 15, § 407(H); 68 COLuM. L. REV.. supra note 4, at 575.
11 Low-RENT MANAGEMENT MANUAL. supra note 22, § 2.9(b) (Mar. 1966).
3' 42 U.S.C. § 1402(l) (1964). Such a practice seems to have been prevalent in the past.
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The only other source previously available for upgrading was a
Housing and Urban Development Loan,32 a source of limited value
since it is an interest bearing short-term (up to ten years) loan
which must be paid by the Authority out of its operating income.M
Obtaining such a loan is contingent upon the Authority's
demonstrating an ability to repay it from operating income within
the stated time limit,u and thus this financing device is not feasible
for those deteriorating projects whose operating income is
insufficient for proper maintenance.
Prior to its modernization program HUD had been reluctant to
reopen a project's development cost and increase bonded
indebtedness for purposes of rehabilitation because of concern that
development funds authorized by Congress could not be legally
diverted from new housing construction to modernization of
existing projects.3
A study of past practices indicates that too great an emphasis
has been placed on fiscal integrity in the operation of public
housing units. This concern has focused, at least until recently, on
For example, the National Capital Housing Authority in the District of Columbia was
prodded by a public outcry about the deplorable conditions of its Barry Farms Project to
apply $385,000 from its operating reserve to a partial refurbishing of that project.
Washington Post, May 29, 1966, at A5. col. 4. Subsequently, however, a detailed proposal
for the complete rehabilitation of Barry Farms was submitted to PHA'with a request for
$1,500,000 in funds to be provided through the sale of additional bonds increasing the
bonded indebtedness of the project. ?4AT'L CAPITAL HOUSING AUTHORITY. ANN. REP.
(1966). PHA approved this request in the amount of $1,354,000. Telephone conversation
with Lester Morton, Deputy Director, NCHA. on November 1H. 1968.
*'See PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION. Low-Rent Housing Manual § 217.1 (1962).
" These requrements are not contained in any of HUD's publications; rather, they are
internal guidelines by which the grants of such loans are regulated. Interview with George
Kaplan, Chief, Financial Review Section, Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, in
Washington, D.C., Oct. 29, 1968; Telphone conversation with Milton Slifkin, Financial
Review Officer, Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Nov. 3, 1968.
34 Id.
1 Interview with Kenneth Cavanaugh, Deputy Director of Tenants' Services, Dep't of
Housing and Urban Development, in Washington, D.C.. Oct. 29, 1968. Section 3679(a) of
the Anti-Deficiency Act forbids an officer from obligating the government in excess of the
amount Congress has made available. 31 U.S.C. § 665(a) (1964). However, the section also
contains an exception which authorizes apportionment or reapportionment in excess of
appropriations where such action is required because of "emergencies involving the safety of
human life" and "the protection of property." 31 U.S.C. § 665(e) (1964). In at least two
instances, however, development funds were so committed-for the modernization of the
Pruitt Igoe Project in St. Louis, see Interview with Kenneth Cavanaugh, supra. and for the
rehabilitation of Barry Farms in the District of Columbia, see note 31 supra.
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the profitable operation of the projects and the use of profits,
termed "residual receipts" 3 by public housing officials, to reduce
the government's annual guaranteed contributions to the payment
of principal and interest on capital indebtedness 7 Further, HAA's
inspection programs seem overly to emphasize fiscal solvency, in
that inspections and recommendations appear concerned primarily
with the operation of projects as economically viable units.
The emphasis in federal housing programs must shift from
fiscal responsibility to rehabilitation and modernization. What has
been needed at the federal level is official recognition that projects
built to rigid standards with projected useful lives of 60 years have
become alarmingly obsolete. Additionally, the institution of a full-
scale federal program is needed to combat public housing
obsolescence and deterioration. A complete survey of public slum
housing should be made to determine the exact dimensions of the
problem and the cost of rehabilitation. Most importantly, the
initiative and responsibility should not be left with the Local
Authorities to determine their own needs in this area nor should the
Authority be permitted to apply for its financing.
3' See PHA, ACC. supra note 15, § 406(d).
HUD's concern with residual receipts was stimulated by pressure from Congress.
Interviews with Kenneth Cavanaugh, Deputy Director of Tenants' Services; George Kaplan,
Chief, Financial Review Section; and Clara Rawlings, Chief, Occupancy and Rental Section,
Dep't of Housing and Urban Development; in Washington, D.C.. Oct. 29, 1968. An example
of this pressure is the following remark by the chairman of a Housing subcommittee on
appropriations:
IlT]he committee has had it in the back of its mind for the last 2 or 3 years of
putting a limitation on these expenditures. If you think it cannot be done, we will
show you how to do it. You had better tighten it up. If you do not, we are going to
tighten up for you right in here.
There is no occasion for letting these local housing authorities go a little bit on the
lax side. It is not their money they are spending. They have been turned footloose.
It appears now that you might be tightening up on your auditing functions with
some limitations, but there ought to be larger residuals, and the reason there are not
larger residuals is your [the local authorities'] high administrative expense. If you
break down the Administrative expense of the average housing authority, compared
with its revenues, instead of being 7 percent, I imagine it is nearer 9 or 10 percent. We
will ask you to advise us on that. If it continues to go up, there is only one thing to
do, and that is to put a limitation on it. It can be done very effectively.
So you just as well get that in your thinking now. We do not want to do it
unless we have to, but it has to be held down, and it is not being held down. It is
going up. Hearings on Independent Offices Appropriations Jbr 1964 Bejbre a
Subconim. of the House Comm. on Appropriations. 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at
1291 (1963) (remarks of.Rep. Albert Thomas, Chairman, Subcomm. on Independent
Offices).
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Many commentators have suggested that the concept of public
housing as an economically viable operation is outmoded. s Thus,
aside from coping with the need for instant rehabilitation, a
preventive program must be instituted involving greater federal
direction and participation and based more on a "subsidy"
approach to public housing. A federal program has been instituted
for upgrading substandard low-rent housing projects.39 Under this
program, HUD made available from authorized and appropriated
development funds sufficient annual contributions to permit
expenditure of approximately $125,000,000 annually for
modernization and rehabilitation of existing projects for fiscal years
1968 and 1969. HUD readily admits, however, that these sums fall
far short of overall modernization needs, and that HUD had to
establish priorities in allotting funds based on a demonstration of
the greatest need and the most good to be accomplished. The
program seems to be a significant departure from HUD's former
view that local projects should be primarily economically
independent operations, and seems to reflect a trend toward the
"subsidy" approach. It also recognizes the concomitant needs for
upgraded management, increased tenant involvement, and more
meaningful social services for tenants.'
The trend away from the fiscal integrity concept is also reflected
in HUD's encouraging Local Authorities to apply residual receipts
to modernization work.4' In addition, the program includes, for the
4 See generally Friedman, supra note 4; Symposium, Housing Part 1H: The Federal Role.
32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 371 (1967).
"' See Low-RENT MANAGEMENT .MANUAL, supra note 22; Dep't of Housing and, Urban
Development, Circular (Nov. 14, 1967).
1' The Low-Rent Management Manual emphasizes these dual goals as follows: "The
program calls not only for upgrading of the physical plants, but for certain changes in
management as well. These two aspects of the program cannot be separated. Local
Authorities obtaining modernization funds will be expected to develop long- and short-range
programs in the following areas: (a) Modernization and rehabilitation of buildings and
grounds; (b) Involvement of the tenants in the plans and programs for the modernization of
the project, changes in management policies and practices, and expanded services and
facilities; (c) Expansion of community service programs and of community facilities where
needed to meet the requirements of the program; (d) Intensification of efforts to assist low-
income families to realize their potential for economic advance; (e) Increased employment by
Local Authorities of low-income tenants.
"All of these lines of activity reflect the Administration's concern that all programs for
low-income families should help such families rise out of their poverty into self-dependence.'
Low-RENT MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 22, § 1.9(3).
'See id. § 1.9(d).
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first time, authorization for local projects to use a portion of their
operating reserves for rehabilitation and modernization 2 HUD's
modernization program has been in operation too short a time to
fully commit available funds or produce concrete results. 3 Because
the immediate need for upgrading is so acute, it is to be hoped that
HUD will accelerate its pace in applying funds to this task.
In addition to the inadequacy of funds earmarked for
rehabilitation and HUD's slow pace in allotting the available
funds, another shortcoming of the new program lies in its failure to
designate HUD as the prime movant in determining the exact
dimensions of the substandard public housing problem and in
initiating individual rehabilitation programs. If the federal
government is more completely to underwrite modernization costs,
it should be the sole judge of where funds are most needed and can
best be applied. If the determination and scope of need must await
local action, HUD cannot be assured that its funds are being
properly and most advantageously employed. This criticism is not
meant as a condemnation of HUD's new program, which is a long
overdue and welcomed reform; the program is concrete evidence of
re-evaluation and re-definition of the goals of public housing and is
an excellent start toward achievement of those goals.
Private "Remedies
The Government's responses to substandard public housing are
limited; however, there remains the possibility of the tenant
bringing a suit on his own behalf against the Local Authority."
One inherent obstacle to this is the lack of formal administrative
procedures available to public housing tenants. While informal
complaints may well be heard by state agencies, there is no direct
right to judicial review under local law, although it has been
suggested that tenants seek review of HAA inaction on their
"The program requires that current residual receipts and existing operating reserves in
excess of 50 percent of normal maximum reserves first be tapped as a source for upgrading
funding before application is made for use of development funds.
11 As of November 1. 1968 only $73,432,000 of the $250 million of development funds
earmarked for this program have been approved by HUD. Telephone conversation with
George Kaplan. Chief, Financial Review Section, Dep't of Housing and Urban Development,
Nov. 1, 1968.
"See generally 68 COLUM. L. REv.. supra note 4.
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complaints under the Administrative Procedure Act 5 which makes
reviewable a "failure to act."
Two possible problems exist in the effective utilization of the
latter approach: (1) What constitutes "an abuse of discretion";46
and (2) do tenants suffer a "legal wrong,"47 and thus gain standing
when the HAA ignores their complaints? Federal courts have
accorded standing to those classes who allege harm to an interest
Congress intended the agency to protect.8 Substandard housing is
the type of injury the congressional statute was designed to prevent.
The aim of the legislation was clearly to protect the tenant,4 and it
appears that some authorities have breached their duty to provide
decent, safe and sanitary housing.
Furthermore, analogous to third party beneficiary suits, for
which public housing tenants would have standing to maintain
under the ACC,61 is the theory that the Federal Housing Act, in
providing that tenants be given decent, safe and sanitary housing,
creates a private cause of action for the members of the class it was
intended to benefit.5' It has long been established that some federal
regulatory statutes create, by implication, a federal cause of
action.52 The theory of extending civil remedies to a person injured
by another's violation of a statute which provides for no such
relief, covers two distinct situations: (1) where the statute may
directly create a duty or prohibit certain acts and the courts create
a new cause of action,?3 or (2) the statute may evidence a standard
of conduct within the framework of an already existing cause of
"15 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. I1, 1966); see 68 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 4, at 566-68.
"See 4 K. DAVIS. ADNtINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.16 (Supp. 1965). Contra. Berger,
.-ldmninistraive .-lrbitrariness and Judicial Review. 65 COLum. L. REV. 55 (1965).
' See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. If. 1966).
"See Note. Federal Judicial Review of State WelJ/re Practices. 67 COLUMt. L. REV. 84.
126-29 (1967); notes 52-55 infra and accompanying text.
"See 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
See notes 70-74 infra and accompanying text.
' Although relief sought under this theory was denied on jurisdictional grounds in
Potrero Hill Community Action Comm. v. Housing Authority, No. 22,012 (9th Cir. April
24. 1969), it is submitted that the theory of the implied cause of action may be invoked
successfully to sustain the requirement of standing.
1 See. e.g.. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); The Chicago Junction Case, 264
U.S. 258 (1924); Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802, modified 83 F. Supp.
613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
3 .g.. Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
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action and the courts imply a duty5 A statutory duty to provide
decent, safe and sanitary dwellings could be inferred from the
broad policy statements of the Federal Housing Act 5
Apart from an implied cause of action, a tenant forced to rely
solely on common law must choose from a basically inadequate
series of remedies. However, those tenants should be apprised of
both the potentiality of several common law remedies and the
problems involved in attempting to employ them.
Under common law, the landlord had no duty to maintain a
dwelling in habitable condition in the absence of an express
covenant5 6 Public housing leases are invariably standard form and
do not include a covenant to repair. However, the contractual duty
to repair set out in the ACC 7 or the statutory duty to repair set
out by state and local housing codes 8 may be treated as
incorporating into the lease an implied duty to repair.
Tie United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in a 1960 decision, Whetzel v. Jess Fisher
Management Co.59 held that the housing regulations create a duty
on the part of the landlord to maintain the premises in a safe
condition and that the landlord is liable to the tenant for injury
sustained as a result of a violation. The court, citing section 2304
of the D.C. regulations, stated, "[a]t the very least, this imposes an
obligation upon the landlord to put the premises in safe condition
prior to their rental." 0 If housing codes may impose a duty upon
the landlord the breach of which will lead to recovery in tort, it
seems logical to contend that those codes also impose a contractual
obligation-an implied covenant that the premises are fit for
decent, safe and sanitary habitation, and meet minimum standards
established in the local codes, the ACC, and the HAA regulations."
5 See Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes. 77 HARV. L.
REV. 285 (1963).
w See 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
m See I H. TIFFANY. REAL PROPERTY § 103 (3d ed. 1939).
' HUD. ACC. supra note 14, § 213.
'" See. e.g.. N. Y. Mut. Dwell. Law § 78 (McKinney 1946).
' 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
"Id. at 949 (emphasis added).
"The landmark Wisconsin case of Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409
(1961), implied a warranty of habitability based on the public policy implicit in legislation
and regulations concerned with housing standards.
Legislation and administrative rules, such as the safeplace statute, building codes
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One other possible ground in tort for implying a duty to repair
may arise because the standard form lease between the Authority
and the tenant generally includes a covenant allowing the Authority
to enter the dwelling for purposes of repair;62 a few courts have held
that a private landlord who merely reserves the right to enter and
repair, without expressing any obligation to do so, is liable in tort
to persons injured on the property by repairable defects. 3 This
doctrine of implied liability through a covenant to enter and repair
seems even more applicable to the public housing situation where
the tenant, with a standard of living only slightly above the
subsistence level, must rely on the Authority's resources to repair
and maintain his premises.
Even if the tenant successfully argues that the Authority
breached an implied duty to maintain and repair, he would be faced
with the traditional doctrine of landlord-tenant law holding that the
covenant to pay rent in a lease is independent of the covenant to
repair" and he could not withhold his rent. His measure of
recovery in damages would be determined by what one
commentator has aptly described as "the amount he could get for
well-maintained premises from a mythical sublessee, . . . [a]
standard bear[ing] . . . little relation -to the. wrong of which the
tenant in fact complains ..
Furthermore, the common law remedy of constructive eviction, 6
and health regulations, all impose certain duties on d property owner with respect to
the condition of his premises. Thus, the legislature has made a policy judgment-that
it is socially (and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a property
owner-which has rendered the old common law rule obsolete. To follow the old rule
of no implied warranty of habitability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent
with the current legislative policy concerning housing standards. The need and social
desirability of adequate housing for people in the era of rapid population increases is
too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal cliche, caveat emptor. Id. at
595-96, !11 N.W.2d 412-13.
0 See note 320 infra and accompanying text.
'3 See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 63, at 421-23 (3d ed. 1964). In De Clara v. Barber
Steamship Lines the New York Court of Appeals hinted at such liability: "A landlord who
has the right to come and go upon the leased premises as he pleases . . . thereby reserve[s] a
privilege of ownership, sufficient to give rise to liability in tort." 309 N.Y. 620, 630, 132
N.E.2d 871, 876 (1956).
"6 S. WILLISTON, CoNrRAcrs § 890 (3d ed. 1962); see Schoshinski, Remedies oJ the
Indigent Tenant: ProposalJbr Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 518, 534-35 (1966).
9168 CoLu.Ni. L. REV., supra note 4, at 563-64.
"Constructive eviction is the result of a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment
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although it does not require an express covenant to repair, is hardly
a propitious remedy for an indigent tenant living in an area whose
shortage of decent housing was the raison d'etre for the
construction of public housing. 7 In order to avail himself of this
doctrine the tenant would have to leave the premises,18 whereas
public housing tenants want to remain and are only desirous of
more habitable conditions. Unless courts aqcept such a novel
doctrine as partial constructive eviction" and treated necessary
maintenance as a quid pro quo for rent collection, both federal
enforcement of ACC violations and the contractual theory of third
party beneficiaries would appear to be more useful to the public
housing tenant. The fact that tenants may be "donee" rather than
"creditor" beneficiaries is of little modern significance; the latest
draft of the Restatement of Contracts virtually obliterates the
implied in all leases. It is established when one shows that the landlord has prevented the
tenant's enjoyment of his interest in the property leased. Generally the acts must be or such
serious and permanent character as to deny the tenant the enjoyment of his possessory rights.
Schoshinski, supra note 64, at 528.
'- No public housing units may be built without the "elimination ...of unsafe or
insanitary dwelling units situated in the locality or metropolitan area substantially equal in
number to the number of newly constructed dwelling units." 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (Supp. II.
1966).
" The riquirement of abandonment within a reasonable time exists because traditionally a
tenant's quiet enjoyment has not been considered impaired unless he is dispossessed. Thus.
interference by the landlord must be of such magnitude that it will render the premises
uninhabitable. Schoshinski, supra note 64. at 529; see Westland Housing Corp. v. Scott, 312
Mass. 375, 44 N.E.2d 959 (1942).
"1 It is a well-established principle that actual partial eviction on the part of the landlord
operates as a suspension of the tenant's liability for the entire rent on the theory that the
landlord may not apportion his own wrong. E.g., Pinching v. Wurdeman, 12 F.2d 164 (D.C.
Cir. 1926); Tuchin v. Chambers, 439 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
This theory of actual partial eviction is predicated on some positive act by the landlord
causing partial ouster, which amounts to the wrong that the courts refuse to apportion. l it
not as serious a wrong, amounting to partial ouster, when the landlord violates his statutory
duty to keep premises in a minimum state of repair and to provide essential services and
thereby deprives a tenant of complete use of a room or a group of rooms within an
apartment while leaving the remaining portion tenantable? There seems to be no logical
reason to differentiate between a wrong committed by a landlord's positive act of
interference and one which results from his failure to obey provisions of a statute or
ordinance. Partial constructive eviction would result from an unrepaired roof leaking in one
room of an apartment, or an inadequate heating system serving only a portion of the
dwelling. The theory of partial constructive eviction has been recognized in similar
circumstances although not to the extent of suspending rent in 1oo. E.g.. Dolph v. Barry,
165 Mo. App. 659, 148 S.W. 196 (1912). See also Charles E. Burt. Inc. v. Seven Grand.
Inc., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N:E.2d 4 (1959); Schoshinski, supra note 64, at 531-32.
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distinction.70 A third party "who is intended to benefit from a
contract may [almost universally] sue to enforce it."' 7 Both the
legislative history and the language of the United States Housing
Act72 and its state counterparts require provision of decent housing.
Although the ACC specifically exempts the HAA from suits by
third parties, 73 no provision is made for exempting the Local
Authority. Allowing tenants to sue as such third party beneficiaries
would provide "the broadest possible remedy-one available in
every state. " 7
Recommendations
1. The need for modernization, rehabilitation, and superior
maintenance should be more directly- and emphatically brought to
the attention of Local Authorities. The new HUD program deals
with the use of operating funds-residual receipts and a portion of
operating reserves-for modernization and rehabilitation in a
negative fashion, requiring that these funds be used before
application is made for development funds. The approach should be
a positive one-affirmative direction to use residual receipts for
these purposes rather than to reduce federal contributions to
discharge existing indebtedness. If a project or authority is
producing high residual receipts while tenants are complaining of
long delays in repairs, appropriate budget modifications should be
ordered to increase expenditures for maintenance items, personnel,
and equipment. Possibly residual receipts should be retained
entirely by Local Authorities to be plowed back immediately into
maintenance and modernization.
Rather than allowing only limited amounts of operating
reserves to be used for modernization, Local Authorities should be
encouraged and directed if necessary to apply their entire reserves
when there exists an immediate and imminent need for
rehabilitation and modernization.
2. HUD's present inspection program does not seem to be
based on any clearly defined standards of maintenance and repair;
;o RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (Tent. Draft No. 3. 1967).
68 COLUM. L. Rtiv.. supra note 4, at 577.
n Id.: see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1402(I) & (2) (1964 & Supp. il. 1966).
n PHA. ACC. supra note 15. § 510.
7 68 COLU.. L.. REv.. supra note 4. at 579.
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regulations should be promulgated by HUD's regional offices to
apply to all projects within the region or all projects within a Local
Authority. The local government's housing code or regulations
could be used as minimal criteria, setting guidelines for both local
project management and federal inspectors. In those areas where
the local governmental body does not apply or enforce its codes
and regulations in public housing,' 5  HUD and the Local
Authorities should work out a program with the local government
whereby public housing will be subject to strict enforcement of
local standards. 76
3. The ACC provides the federal government with various
remedies ranging from forced conveyance of title to "any and all
actions at law or in equity."7 Federal authorities must become
much more demanding in requiring proper maintenance, and in
following up on inspections and recommendations.
4. Project managers uniformly point to tenant misuse and
abuse of project property as the primary cause of deterioration and
lament the vandalism and excessive wear and tear by tenants
untrained in apartment living. As these are certainly substantial
causes of deterioration, a training program in apartment
housekeeping should be developed.78 Many authorities already issue
training -handbooks to tenants on the proper use and maintenance
of apartments and appliances. The practice of tenant painting and
redecoration with materials supplied by management, encouraged
by local project authorities at HUD's suggestion, should be
expanded to promote tenant self-help in performing other repairs
See id. at 567-68.
, Some municipalities, such as New Orleans, do not enforce their housing code because
they feel that the Local Authority adequately policies its own units. Letter from Christopher
J. Bellone, Administrator, Dep't of Safety & Permits, Div. of Housing Improvement, City of
New Orleans, to the author, Aug. 2, 1967. The District of Columbia does not enforce its
code against the NCHA because it believes that it lacks the power to do so, presumably on
the theory that since the NCHA is a federal agency it enjoys sovereign immunity from state
and local law. The District of Columbia Department of Licenses and Inspections does
inspect public housing, but it has never taken the Authority to court. Tenants from several
NCHA projects have recently filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia to compel enforcement of the city's housing code to their homes. Washington
Post, Nov. 10. 1968, at CI, col. 1.
- PHA. ACC. supra note 15, § 508(B); see notes 14-21 supra and accompanying text.
71 One pilot project is in existence in Gulfport, Mississippi, Interview with Kenneth
Cavanaugh, Deputy Director of Tenants' Services, Dep't. of Housing and Urban
Development, in Washington, D.C.. Oct. 29, 1968.
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and maintenance, especially if it is impossible for management to
perform such tasks immediately.
The federal government has recognized tenant unions and their
concomitant formal grievance machinery. 9 these and similar tenant
organizations could play a vital role in establishing programs to
promote tenant cooperation and assistance in policing project
property against vandalism and other forms of tenant misuse!O
These programs would foster pride in "their own" projects among
public housing tenants. HUD's modernization program recognizes
the need for tenant involvement and the humanization of
management attitudes toward its clientele by urging a commitment
on the part of Local Authorities to develop programs in this area.81
5. The HAA should require that public housing leases explicitly
impose the duty of repair and maintenance on project management.
The public housing program contemplates this to be the
responsibility of management and an express undertaking in the
lease will facilitate judicial enforcement of this duty in private
actions by public housing tenants.
Even in projects which are not dilapidated or deteriorated, a
constant tenant complaint is the inordinate delay in making
repairs.82 By allowing long delays public housing management is
not fulfilling its obligation or carrying out the legislative mandate
to provide decent, safe and sanitary housing. In projects showing
residual receipts, more maintenance people should be hired;
providing decent housing should take priority over operating at a
profit. Furthermore, since unreasonable delay in maintenance is a
breach of the ACC, the federal government should utilize its
remedies to correct the situation.
6. Channels of communication must be developed between
public tenants and the regional HAA offices so that, through
tenant complaints, the federal authorities can better carry out their
role of assuring that public housing is accomplishing its purposes.
", See 42 U.S.C. § 2785(d) (1964); see notes 262-63, 307 infra and accompanying texts.
" See generally Davis & Schwartz, Tenant Unions: An Experiment in Private Law-
Making in HOUSING FOR THE POOR: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 100 (N.Y.U. School of Law
Project on Social Welfare Law, Supp. 1. 1967). See Note, Tenant Unions: Collective
Bargaining and the Low-Income Tenant, 77 YALE L.J. 1368, 1369 (1968).
"See Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular (Mar. 22, 1968).
"Tenants have cited instances of delays of six months in replacing broken windows,
Interview with Mrs. Lillian Wright, Vice-President, Barry Farms Tenant Union, in
Washington, D.C., July 11, 1967; or fixing plumbing leaks, and delays of years in repairing
holes in the living room walls, see Washington Post, Nov. 10, 1968, at C1, col. 4.
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11. TENANT ELIGIBILITY
The rights of the indigent are undefined and largely ignored in
Local Authority determinations of tenant eligibility. Many Local
Authorities have established grounds for eviction and denial of
admission which are without statutory bases, are inconsistent with
the overall objectives of our public housing and anti-poverty
programs and are often unconstitutional. The only federal
legislative criterion is that tenants be low-income families. 3
Without legislative mandate, however, Authorities have declared
tenants ineligible for public housing on the basis of vague
desirability standards, on the equally vague basis of violations of
lease provisions, for giving birth to and housing illegitimate
children, in retaliation for constitutionally protected activities, or
for no expressed reason at all." Moreover, there is a decided lack
of procedural safeguards to control Authorities in making their
determination of substantive grounds for denial of the benefits of
public housing."'
Nothing in the legislative history of the Housing Act and its
subsequent amendments indicates that Congress intended the setting
of any standards for eligibility other than low income. Prior to
1959, the responsibility for setting eligibility standards rested solely
with the federal government. Following the spirit of the Housing
Act, the Public Housing Authority Act standards dealt exclusively
with income, the sole federal legislative criterion, and granted
priorities only on the basis of military service and certain
disabilities. In 1959 amendments to the statute vested in the Local
Housing Authority the primary responsibility for determining
eligibility and discretion in making that determination. These
amendments did not add any substantive eligibility requirements to
- 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
"'See. e.g.. Lewis v. Housing Authority. 397 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1968) (Talladega. Ala.):
Richardson v. Housing Authority. Civ. Action No. 678 (E.D.N.C. May 13. 1968) (New
Bern. N.C.), Rosen. Tenants* Rights in Public Housing. in HoUsING FOR THE POOR: RIGHTS
A.NI) REMEDIES 154. 162-64, 186-98 (N.Y.U. School of Law Project on Social Welfare Law,
Supp. 1. 1967): Boston Housing Authority, Resolution Establishing Policies and Standards
Governing Occupancy of Federally-Aided Developments. at 9 (Oct. 28. 1965): Chicago
Housing Authority, Resolution No. 62-CHA-192 § 1(F), at 3 (July 25. 1968); Letter from
Bettie McJunkin. Law Reform Coordinator. Milwaukee Plan Legal Services. to the author,
Aug. 23, 1968 (Milwaukee. Wis.).
'G See section on Tenant -Eligibility, infra.
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existing federal policy but merely decentralized and transferred the
power to set income limitations and establish priorities among
eligible families to the Local AuthoritiesY5
State enabling statutes are likewise silent as to continued
occupancy standards, except for the income limitation. They are
concerned primarily with the maintenance of the low rent character
of projects in tenant selectivity, continued occupancy, and rent
determinations.17 They do empower the Local Authority to
establish rules and regulations to "effect the powers and purposes
of the authority," but with the circumscription that such
regulations not be "inconsistent with this Act."8
The ACC echoes this legislative sentiment. Although it does not
mention eviction per se, the ACC emphasizes the maintenance of
the low rent character of each project;." moreover, scrutiny of the
contract reveals that the exclusive concern of the federal
government in the area of continued occupancy is that tenants
continue to meet the income requirements.
Nonetheless, some HAA directives seem, by implication, to
authorize Local Authorities to establish additional substantive
requirements for eligibility. The Low-Rent Management Manual
and the ACC allow the Local Authority to promulgate its own
admission and eviction policies and place no express prohibition on
the consideration of facts other than income. The only requirement
is that admission regulations must be "reasonable." ' " However, the
Local Housing Authority Management Handbook goes much
further by expressly allowing the admission policies of Local
Authorities to take into account factors not contained in the Act
"provided they would not be contrary to the purposes of the low-
rent program."'" In recent years many Authorities have relied upon
" Housing Act of 1959 § 501, 73 Stat. 654, 679-81.
'0See. e.g.. MIss. CODi. ANN. § 7302 (1952): Mo. REv. STAT. § 99.100 (1952); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35. §' 1666 (1964).
m Miss. Comr ANN. § 7300(a) (1952). accord Ti'x. Rirv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1269L
(1963); WASH. Rirv. CODE ANN. § 35.82.070(I) (1965).
A model enabling act formulated by HAA is even more emphatic. It provides that '[a~n
authority shall issue regulations establishing eligibility requirements, consistent with the
purposes and objectives of this Act, for admission to and continued occupancy in its
projects." HOUSING ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION. DRAFT E'NABLING ACT § 10 (1965).
" PHA. ACC. supra note 15, §§ 201(I), 202. 204, 207 (May 1967).
s' Low-RENT MANAGEMENT MANUAL. supra note 22, § 3.5 (Oct. 1967).
" PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION. LOCAL HOUSING AUTHORITY MANAGI:MI:NT
HANDBOOK Pt. IV. § I. v 2 (f) (July, 1965).
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this directive to validate their establishment of restrictive admission
requirements 2
It may be argued that since the ACC charges the Local
Authority to operate each project "in such manner as to promote
serviceability, efficiency, economy, and stability, '9 3 it, implicitly
authorizes eviction for tenant conduct which would immediately
threaten these concepts. But it is not contended here that the Local
Authority should be powerless to evict for such reasons; rather, it is
submitted that the grounds presently established for eviction often
do not accomplish, and, in fact, are not even calculated to meet
this end.
Several HAA regulations and directives do touch upon the
problem of continued eligibility. The Low-Rent Management
Manual is concerned exclusively with income as a qualification for
continued tenure,94 while the Management Handbook grants wider
latitude to Local Authorities, allowing them to evict for income
misrepresentation and violations of lease terms."5 In a section
entitled "Tenant Leases and Leasing Policies," the Handbook
recommends a monthly lease to "permit any necessary evictions to
be accomplished with a minimum of delay and expense upon the
giving of a statutory Notice To Quit." 9 This language may be
interpreted to empower Local Authorities to give 30-days notice only
when a tenant becomes ineligible because of over-income, the only
ostensible statutory grounds for termination; unfortunately, it has,
instead, been viewed as impliedly sanctioning evictions without
cause.9 7 Basically, the additional criteria adopted by Local
Authorities for admission and continued occupancy fall into two
categories: (1) residency requirements, and (2) standards evaluating
the "desirability" of the tenant.
Residency Requirements
Many housing authorities impose a residency requirement in
n HUD. ACC. supra note 14, § 206.
Id. § 201(1).
U Low-RENT. MANAGEMENT MANUAL. supra note 22, § 3.6 (Oct. 1967).
' PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION. LOCAL HOUSING AUTHORITY MANAGEMENT
HANDBOOK, Pt. IV. § 1, f 8 (g) (July 1965).
"Id. § I, r 6(d)(I).
'7See. e.g.. Brand v. Chicago Housing Authority, 120 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1941); Housing
Authority v. Turner, 201 Par. Super. 62, 191 A.2d 869 (1963); Rosen, supra note 84, at 185.
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determining eligibility for public housing s Such a test not only
may arbitrarily deny decent housing but also, in a very real sense,
may affect the constitutionally protected freedoms of association9
and movement1t° As in the case of the undesirability standards,
there is nothing in the federal housing statutes or their legislative
history to sanction a residency requirement; the only federal
legislative criterion for eligibility is the income requirement.
Although the Housing Act and the ACC allow great latitude and
discretion in setting admissions policies, each omits any reference
to residency in setting forth possible factors to be considered in
eligibility and preference. 101 Most state enabling statutes do not
mention residency requirements, although a few, such as those of
Minnesota and Massachusetts, do speak of giving preference or.
The NYCHA has a two-year rsidency requirement which may be waived for families
who "by history and roots" are New York residents. NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY,
MANAGEMENT MANUAL ch. Ill, § ll(c)(5)(a) (Feb. 15, 1961). The Chicago Housing Authority
has a one-year requirement which is waived for "interns and resident physicians stationed in
Chicago Hospitals, American Indians relocated into the City of Chicago upon request by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, families of servicemen and student families." Chicago Housing
Authority, Resolution No. 62-CHA-192 § I(D), at 2 (July 25, 1968). The Boston Housing
Authority also has a one-year requirement with an exception for families who are displaced
and without housing "through no fault of [their] own." Boston Housing Authority,
Resolution Establishing Policies and Standards Governing Occupancy of Federally-Aided
Developments, § IV(a)(5), at II (Oct. 28, 1965).
"See. e.g.. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); NAACP v. Bdtton, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Many indigents move because of a desire to
associate with their family or relatives. See Brief for Appellee Harrell at 37, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 89 S.Ct. 1322 (1969).
'See Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329 (1969); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 -U.S. I
(1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.'160 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
35 (1867).
The tragic effect of residency requirements on indigents was recently recognized in the
Kerner Commission Report. The Commission's findings, while directed to the welfare
residence requirement, apply equally to the effects of the residency requirement on public
housing applicants:
[jn most states, there is a residency requirement, generally averaging around a year,
before a person is eligible to receive welfare. These state regulations were enacted to
discourage persons from moving from one state to another to take advantage of
higher welfare payments. In fact, they appear to have had little, if any, impact on
migration and have frequently served to prevent those in greatest need-desperately
poor families arriving in a strange city-from receiving the boost that might give
them a fresh start. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT, 253
(1968).
101 See 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964); HUD, ACC, supra note 14, § 206.
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priority to inhabitants of the municipality in which the project is
located if the number of applicants should exceed the number of
units available.102
Although no legislative mandate exists to impose such a
residency requirement, the HAA has lent some support to the
validity of the requirement through its advisory directive, the Local
Housing Authority Management Handbook. In authorizing Local
Authorities to consider factors other than those listed in the Act in
establishing admission policies, the Handbook cites as one example
residency in the locality for a minimum period. i0 HAA authorities
have indicated that a residency requirement was authorized because
HAA has traditionally viewed the initiation, planning, and
development of public housing of low income families as a local
rather than a federal function. It has therefore felt that it was
reasonable to allow municipalities to limit low-cost housing to its
residents.' 0'
Seizing upon this HAA authorization, Local Authorities have
imposed residency requirements.0" As in the case of the period of
residency required to qualify for welfare payments, the condition
has been attached to public housing eligibility, theoretically at least,
to prevent an influx of the poor into a particular locality solely to
obtain public housing not available at their former residence.10 1
Welfare authorities argue that without minimum residency the
increase in welfare payments resulting from the influx of indigents
will cause a serious drain on the state and local municipal
'0. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.. ch. 121, § 26FF (1968 Supp.): MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 462.481 (1963).
"il PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION. LOCAL HOUSING AUTHORITY MANAGEMNT
HANDBOOK. Pt. IV. § I, ' 2(f) (July 1965).
"I Interview with Clara Rawlings, Chief. Occupancy and Rental Section. Dep't of
Housing and Urban Development, in Washington. D.C.. Oct. 29, 1968. Even prior to 1959.
when the responsibility for setting admission standards rested with the federal authorities, at
least in theory, the PHA regulations sanctioned a residency requirement. PUBLIC HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION, Low RENr HOUSING MANUAL § 403.1 (Feb. 1957) (superseded).
" See note 98 supra.
'" Typically. durational residence laws for welfare benefits do not give the rationale for
their classification: nor is any legislative history available to suggest a purpose. See Brief for
Appellee Harrell at 43-44. Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S.Ct. 1322 (1969). However, they have
their roots in the settlement system of the Elizabethan poor laws which sought to return
paupers to the jurisdiction which had the responsibility for supporting them. See Mandelker.
The Settlement Requirement in General Assistance I. 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 355; Mandelker,
The Seilenment Requirement in General Assistance 11. 1956 WASH. U.L.Q. 21; Mandelker.
l-Fclusin and Removal Legislation. 1956 WIs. L. RI'v. 57.
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treasuries.10 7 Yet an influx of indigents seeking to obtain public
housing benefits hardly seems to pose a serious threat to local
treasuries. The underlying financial concept of public housing is the
economic independence of each project. The original financing is
secured through public bond issues whose amortization, guaranteed
by the federal government, is in fact effectuated entirely through
federal contributions and profits from project operation.1 8 Thus,
increased project construction and operation resulting from an
influx of the poor due to the elimination of a residency requirement
would not require the direct commitment of any local or state
funds."' 9 Relaxing the residency requirement, it has further been
argued, would indirectly affect local finances because indigents
supposedly flocking to a locality to obtain public housing would in
many instances also be in need of, public welfare assistance, public
health benefits, and other public social services, including public
education. Therefore, the cost of attending to these needs would
result in increased expenditures by the local government without the
normally concomitant tax contribution to the public treasury."0
Moreover, serious doubt exists as to the constitutionality of the
residency requirement. Such tests in welfare assistance programs
have been held unconstitutional by several federal district courts",
*0 See Brief for Appellant Washington.at 9, Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 'S. Ct. 1322 (1969);
Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests Jbr General and Categorical Assistance
Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 567, 585-86 (1966).
* See generally Ledbetter, supra note 8, at 493-95.
,"It may be argued that public housing projects do not pay local property taxes and thus
an increase in public housing units decreases revenue from property taxes, however, the
federal government does make payments in lieu of taxes which would seem to more than
compensate for the loss of property taxes. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 648 n.35.
'IQ See Harvith, supra note 107. Another justification presented for the presence of a
minimum residency requirement is that a locality in the throes of an across-the-board
housing shortage, both private and public, has a primary responsibility to its long time
residents, rather than recent arrivals. c(. People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 IlI. 557,
566, 30 N.E.2d 46, 51 (1940).
It could be argued that the residency test is a natural by-product of the equivalent
elimination program whereby the construction of new public housing units is limited to the
number of slum dwelling units destroyed. Wagner-Steagall Act, 50 Stat. 891 (1937), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (Supp. I. 1965). See generally Robinson & Altman,
Equivalent Elimination Agreements in Public Housing Projects. 22 B.U.L. REV. 375 (1942).
Therefore, to allow newly arrived families to move into these units along with displaced
families would be inconsistent with the objectives of the equivalent elimination program.
M Johnson v. Robinson, 296 F. Supp. 1165 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Greene v. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967). Preliminary injunctions enjoining statewide
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and recently by the Supreme Court,"' on the grounds that they
infringe upon the constitutionally protected freedom of movement
and that such a test violates the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. Similar attacks can be made on the minimum
residency requirements for public housing eligibility."'
Since public housing is state action"' it may be argued, on the
basis of the Supreme Court's Shapiro v. Thompson decision,"S that
the imposition of a period of residency requirement impedes
freedom of interstate movement. Shapiro involved the
constitutionality of state statutes which denied welfare assistance to
indigents who had not resided in that state or locality for a
minimum period of time. The state admittedly enacted the statute
to protect its treasury from the drain which would result from the
heavy influx of indigents." 6 The Court held, however, that the
purpose of inhibiting indigents from entering the state was an
unconstitutional deprivation of the right to travel."'
The residency requirement in public housing is probably equally
as direct a burden on state to state freedom of movement as the
statutes in Shapiro. An indigent will be much less likely to move to
another jurisdiction where he might have greater job opportunities,
when he realizes that he will be unable for a certain period of time
to obtain decent housing which he can afford."'
It might be contended that Congress, in empowering the HAA
to administer the public housing program and set implementary
regulations, has acquiesced in the LHA Management Handbook,"'
thus allowing Local Authorities to impose a residency requirement,
and that by such approval Congress itself is the actual regulator of
enforcement of durational residence laws have been granted in several other jurisdictions.
Alvarado v. Dunn, Civil No. 12,399 (D. Conn. 1968); Montell v. Dandridge. Civil Action
No. 18,792 (D. Md. 1967); Ramos v. Health & Social Serv. Bd., 276 F. Supp. 474 (E.D.
Wis. 1967).
11 Shapiro v. Thompson. 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969).
See generally Harvith, supra note 107.
" In order to receive financial and advisory aid from the federal government, the local
governing body must adopt an ordinance creating a local housing authority, pursuant to
state enabling legislation; Public Housing Administration, Dep't of Housing & Urban
Development, Public Housing Fact Sheet 2 (undated).
" 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969).
I d. at 1325, 1328.
Id. at 1329.
"'See Harvith, supra note 107, at 618.
"I See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
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interstate commerce. However, in an area of interstate commerce
having such a direct and vital impact on human rights and liberties,
Congress should be required to be explicit in its regulation.2 0
Assuming arguendo that the state purposes allegedly underlying
the residency requirement 2' are valid, other less discriminatory
means are available to accomplish these ends. A residency or state
citizenship requirement could easily be imposed without setting a
minimum period. Further, whether an applicant was a bona fide
resident or whether he had entered the area solely to obtain public
housing could be determined through investigation, just as other
determinations of qualification are presently made.1'2 The burden of
proof should rest with the Local Authorities and procedures for
determination should be established to satisfy procedural due
process requirements. It would seem, therefore, that since less
restrictive means can be employed to accomplish the state purpose,
the minimum period of residency requirement is an unreasonable
classification in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.tn
The effect of the various fixed period residency requirements is
to relegate needy families to slum housing for the particular time
period established, even though they otherwise qualify under the
Housing Act. To deny public housing to those families, if units are
available, is unconscionable and certainly contrary to all enunciated
national housing and anti-poverty goals. The otherwise harsh effect
of the residency requirement would be ameliorated, in areas where
because of a shortage, public housing would not be available to a
new resident for a substantial period of time in any event. In this
,n See Harvith, supra note 107, at 592.
" See notes 106-07 supra and accompanying text.
'1 Cy. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1965).
"I It is extremely doubtful that the local government's purpose of denying public housing
to those who would enter the locale for the, sole purpose of obtaining it, is reasonable and
valid. In Shapiro, the Court stated that 'a State may no more try to fence out those
indigents who seek higher welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents generally."
89 S. Ct. at 1330; and held that attempts to do so was an unconstitutional deprivation of
equal protection. Id. A state does not, and constitutionally could not, deny benefits of its
superior state universities, other public school systems, and other public services and
programs to a citizen of the state because he entered the state for the very purpose of
receiving these services. Cy.2 Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964). Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). So also a state or local government should not be allowed to
deny decent housing to an individual because he entered the locale for the very purpose of
procuring it. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969).
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situation, however, a minimum period of residency is not required;
the shortage serves to accomplish whatever purpose the residency
requirement is intended to serve. But even within an area
experiencing a shortage of public housing units, the residency
requirement can still produce harsh results.
Admission. The former eligibility requirements of the New York
City Housing Authority (NYCHA) are probably the most refined
aggrandizement of a desirability standard. 24 The NYCHA
Resolution stated that a ground for admissibility was whether the
applicant would be a "desirable tenant." The standard that was
used to determine desirability set out five prohibitions:
[T]he family will not or does not constitute (1) a detriment to the
health, safety or morals of its neighbors or the community, (2) an
adverse influence upon sound family and community life, (3) a
source of danger to the peaceful occupation of the other tenants,
(4) a source of danger or cause of damage to the premises or
property of the Authority, or (5) a nuisance.12
The Resolution then stated:
In making such determination consideration shall be given to the
family, parental control over children, family stability, medical and
other past history, reputation, conduct and behavior, criminal
record if any, occupation of wage earners, and any other data or
injormation with respect to the family that has a bearing upon its
desirability .... "2I
Recently the NYCHA promulgated new standards for admission.'12
The most essential change is in the new standards from which
"[t]he exercise of moral judgment is precluded.' '1 2 But this is no
more than an enlightened first step; many other Authorities
throughout the country still retain standards of eligibility other
than low income. 29
,M See New York City Housing Authority, Resolution Relating to Desirability as a
Ground for Elibibility, No. 62-9-683 (Sept. 12, 1962); New York City Housing Authority,
Desirability Standards for Admission of Tenants, GM-1287 (Nov. 29, 1961), revised. GM-
1632 (May 9, 1968).
"I New York City Housing Authority, Resolution Relating to Desirability as a Ground
for Eligibility, No. 62-9-683 (Sept. 12, 1962).
121 Id. (emphasis added).
'2 New York City Housing Authority, Revised Standards for Admission of Tenants, GM-
1632 (May 9, 1968), revising GM-1287 (Nov. 29, 1961).
1
2 Id.
" See note 84 supra.
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Illegitimacy is the most prominent obstacle barring admission
to public housing projects under the guise of the desirability
standard.3 ' The recent case of Thomas v. Housing Authorityl3 l
exposed a directive of the Little Rock, Arkansas Local Authority
providing that a person ". . . having children born out of wedlock
shall not be eligible for admission or continued occupancy."' 32
The Los Angeles Housing Authority considers common-law
marriage as a basis for the denial of admission, even while
recognizing that common-law marriage, per se, is not conclusive
proof of an unstable family.'3 This policy is premised upon two
considerations. The ACC requires a "family unit," supposedly
excluding living groups of unrelated persons, and California law
does not recognize common-law marriages.' 3 A provision of this
nature not only seems irrelevant to the goals of the Public Housing
Act; it ignores the findings of modern sociology'3 that this type of
institutional arrangement is often the rule in low-income Negro
neighborhoods.
Several arguments have been raised attempting to support the
desirability standard as a determinant of public housing eligibility.
The NYCHA, justifying its former imposition of a desirability
standard, stated that its purpose was "to create for. . . tenants an
118See Lewis v. Housing Authority, 397 F.2d 178, 180-81 n.2 (5th Cir. 1968); notes 190-
93 infra and accompanying text. In Lewis, Negro tenants of the Talladega Housing
Authority were given a notice to vacate without an explanation or reason; however, plaintiffs
either had or were expecting illegitimate children and an Authority rule made illegitimacy a
ground for eviction. After a'district court granted a temporary restraining order, the
Authority rescinded the notices to vacate and notified the court that they had implemented
procedures pursuant to the HUD circular of February 7, 1967. Dep't of Housing and Urban
Development, Circular (Feb. 7, 1967). The district court dismissed the case as moot and
plaintiffs appealed. After oral argument, the Authority notified the Fifth Circuit that it had
repealed its illegitimacy rule and replaced it with a regulation (identical to the New York
resolution) conditioning eligibility and continued occupancy on "desirability." Plaintiffs
objected to the new regulation on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. The Fifth Circuit
then reversed and remanded to allow plaintiffs to adapt their pleadings to the new
circumstances and to allow the district court to consider the newly raised constitutional
claims. 397 F.2d at 180-81 n.2.
' 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
, Id. at 578.
'* Note, Nonfinancial Eligibility and Eviction Standards in Public Housing- The
Problem Fanily in the Great Society, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1122, 1132 (1968).
lu Id. at 1132-33.
' See generally L. RAINWATER & W. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE
POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 5 (1967).
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environment conducive to healthful living, family stability, sound
family and community relations and proper upbringing of
children" and noted that "occupancy by families whose conduct
and behavior, family life, lack of parental control over children,
and ways of living create influences and effects that are adverse and
detrimental to other families in- the project or the entire
community, seriously interferes with the objectives of the Authority
for wholesome family and community life, frequently constitutes a
danger to the health, safety, or morals of their neighbors, may be a
cause of damage to the property of the Authority, and interferes
with the proper administration by the Authority of its projects."'' "
Proponents of a desirability standard also make the economic
argument that such a standard is required to weed out the
"problem family," the products of broken homes, or the chronic
unemployed, because such tenants would irrevocably impair their
federally imposed quest for fiscal solvency by destroying property
and being chronically delinquent in rent payments.37
However, there are strong statutory policies and constitutional
arguments against the desirability standard as a determinant of
tenant eligibility. The desirability standard and its supporting
concepts are compatible with neither the policy of providing "a
decent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family,' ' 8 nor with the policy and objectives of the war on poverty
to open to everyone "the opportunity to live in decency and
dignity."'' 3 There is evidence that the pendulum of public housing
objectives has swung from providing shelter for the respectable and
temporary poor to playing a major role in the rehabilitation of the
permanently poor."' The desirability standard bars achievement of
this goal by denying an opportunity for rehabilitation to those
families and persons whose need is most acute and by providing aid
only to those who are most likely to achieve economic self-
sufficiency.
The standards of undesirability, whether formally enunciated or
informally applied, are the "very badges of the poor" for whom
,'A New York City Housing Authority, Resolution Relating to Desirability as a Ground
for Eligibility, No. 62-9-683 (Sept. 12, 1962).
' See Chicago Housing Authority, Resolution No. 62-CHA-192 § I(F) (July 25, 1968).
'42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
'a42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1964).
Iu,.ee PUBLIC HOUSING Is THE TENANTS, supra note 7. at 10-I1.
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public housing is designed. The application of these standards
operates in many cases to deny decent housing to those most in
need. One can choose any of the grounds which may disqualify an
applicant and demonstrate that such conditions are more prevalent
among the poor. Such factors as a record of poor rent payment or
eviction from private housing for nonpayment of rent, illegitimate
children, a history of irregular employment, the separation of
husband and wife twice in the previous five years, lack of parental
control over children, and placement of children with relatives or
agencies have disqualified potential applicants.' The incongruous
situation is created whereby these conditions, normally associated
with so-called "problem families," the alleviation of which is a
basic rationale for the existence of public housing, are the very
grounds for denying them housing. The basic goal of public
housing cannot be achieved by requiring those whose morals may
have been affected or molded by their slum environment to remain
in that environment. Furthermore, the entire history of low-cost
housing legislation is bereft of any requirement that an applicant
prove his moral worthiness to obtain the benefits of the housing
programs. The sole question should be: Is this family in need of
low cost housing? Any program which makes need secondary to a
determination of desirability is inconsistent with the statutory
purpose of public housing laws."'
141 See Rosen, supra note 84, at 224; Community Service Society, Not Without Hope 65-
72 (Community Serv. Soc'y of N.Y.. 1958). The denial of admissions on these grounds in
New York should be eliminated by the NYCHA's recently promulgated guidelines. See New
York City Housing Authority, Revised Standards for Admission of Tenants, GM-1632
(May 9, 1968), revising GM-1287 (Nov. 29, 1961). This does not mean, however, that other
authorities are not now, or may not in the future, deny admissions on these grounds either
through established regulations or on an ad hoc basis. See Lewis v. Housing Authority, 397
F.2d 178, 180-81 n.2 (5th Cir. 1968) (Talladega, Alabama Authority apparently adopted
New York's former resolution on eligibility for admission); Letter from Bettie McJunkin,
Law Reform Coordinator, Milwaukee Plan Legal Services, to the author, Aug. 23, 1968
(applicants in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, denied admission on basis of 'poor housekeeping"
without published standards).
14 A recent article has excellently demonstrated the unconstitutionality of automatically
rejecting unwed mothers from public housing. Rosen, supra note 84, at 227-42. Beginning
with the proposition that although public housing might be considered a privilege rather than
a right, the government, acting in the capacity of a landlord, still cannot withhold the benefit
of public housing upon an arbitrary or unreasonable condition; the reasonableness of the
condition must be examined in light of the interests of the applicants so excluded and the
purposes of the program. Id. at 233-42. Analogous to this position are the cases declaring
unconstitutional the rejection, under the auspices of the Gwinn Amendment, of individuals
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The principle that restrictive admission policies are contrary to
the purposes of the low-rent program has been afforded some
judicial recognition. Thomas v. Housing Authority 3 held that
application of the so-called "illegitimacy regulations" was violative
of the fourteenth amendment.
[A]n indiscriminate denial of access to public housing to
families unfortunate enough to have or acquire one or more
illegitimate children would .. . deprive of the real or supposed
benefits of the program many of the very people who need it
most-the poorest and most ignorant of the poor. An
administrative policy which involves such a denial does not square
with the humane purpose of the low rent housing program."'
Thomas was a class action brought to test the validity of the Local
Authority's regulation which rejected applicants or evicted tenants
if any member of their family had an illegitimate child. The
individual plaintiffs were two women whose applications for
admission were denied because they were the mothers of illegitimate
children. The court held that illegitimacy by itself is too narrow a
basis for eviction or rejection and that the automatic denial of
housing to unwed mothers violated both the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, a holding which
HUD has followed in requiring'that Local Authorities not auto-
who were members of subversive organizations or refused to sign loyalty oaths. E.g..
Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 (1954); Lawson v.
Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605, cert. denied. 350 U.S. 882 (1955). The
author concludes that even if an unwed mother is in fact morally unfit, moral unfitness is an
unreasonable basis for her exclusion from public housing; such a rule is overly broad in its
sweep. Rosen, supra note 84, at 239. See generally McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 525 (1960). He also' argues that such a policy is inconsistent with the original
purpose of the public housing program and is thus an unreasonable classification in 'violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Rosen, supra note 84, at 239-42.
The author did not extend his condemnation to the type of broad desirability standard
formerly used in New York and presently the practice in many areas, but it would seem that
cogent arguments can be made that a general undesirability standard is unconstitutional, or
at least that many of the conditions which are used to determine desirability are
unconstitutional. Central to this argument is the fact that the existence of one or more of
these conditions disqualifies a potential applicant, rather than a finding 9f undesirability
based on all factors. See generally P. Spriggs, Eviction from Public Housing in New York
Ciiy on the Basis of "Non-Desirability," (1965) (unpublished paper on file at Project on
Social Welfare Law, N.Y.U. School of Law).
1 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967). See generally 56 GEo. L.J. 1215 (1968).
1" 282 F. Supp. at 580-8-1.
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matically deny admission or continued occupancy to particular
classes of tenants, such as unwed mothers. 5 It added, however, that
illegitimacy coupled with additional behavioral criteria may support
a valid finding of ineligibility."'
" 282 F. Supp. at 580; Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular (Dec. 17
1968).
'See 282 F. Supp. at 581. The prohibition of most present policies is absolute. They
make no distinction between the unwed mother with one illegitimate child and the unwed
mother with ten of such children; they do not take into account the circumstances of the
illegitimate birth or births, the age, knowledge, training or experience of the mother, or the
possibility or likelihood of future illegitimate births. In Richardson v. Housing Authority,
Civil No. 678 (E.D:N.C. May 13, 1968) tenants were required to covenant in their lease that
-[i]f additional illegitimate children are born to me or any member of my immediate family
during my tenancy in properties of the Landlord . . . I will within thirty (30) days after
birth of such child, vacate and remove myself and family from any property or housing
accommodations either owned, operated, or managed by the Landlord. ... Id., Plaintiff's
Complaint at 6. The lease gave the Authority alternative remedies-either eviction or a $50
fine. Id. at 6-7; Rosen, supra note 84, at 230; 4 WELFARE L. BULL. 6-7 (1966).
Furthermore, in another case, Strawder v. New York City Housing Authority, Index No.
02212-67 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Feb. 7, 1967), noted in 8 WELFARE L. BULL. 3-4 (1967), an
applicant was denied admission under New York's former "'clear and present danger"
criterion because one of her children was.having adjustment difficulties in the first grade. See
New York City Housing Authority, Desirability Standards for Admission of Tenants, GM-
1287 (Nov. 29, 1961), revised, GM-1632 (May 9, 1968); note 162 infra and accompanying
text. Later investigation revealed the charge was unfounded, and suggested the possibility
that the real ground for denial of admission was the fact that she had several children born
out of wedlock who had been legitimized by her subsequent marriage to their father. Even if
the child was having such difficulties, however, it does not seem to be a reasonable basis for
denial of public housing. Is a family with such a child necessarily a "clear and present
danger to public housing tenants or property"?
Manigo v. New York City Housing Authority illustrates the danger that a juvenile record
or records of arrests, albeit without any convictions, may be the basis for denying admission
to public housing. 51 Misc. 2d 829, 273 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aJj'd meni.. 27
App. Div. 2d 803, 279 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1008 (1967). This
applicant was declared ineligible because of her husband's prior record. The "record"
consisted of four adjudications as a juvenile delinquent, several arrests without conviction,
and one conviction on a minor offense. Except for one arrst which resulted in dismissal,
these all occurred when the husband was a minor and before he was married and became a
father. The New York court upheld the denial of admission, conceding that a juvenile record
"standing by itself, cannot be utilized to operate as a forfeiture of any right or privilege,"
but added that 'this does not mean that an applicant's entire behavior pattern over a period
of years may not be a proper subject of scrutiny by an administrative agency before granting
a right or privilege such as eligibility to public housing." Id. at 832, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
As the plaintiff's argument on appeal pointed out, this holding seems to conflict "with the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the constitutional guarantee of due process of
law in the ascertaining of guilt." Petitioner's Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to
Appeal to the Court of Appeals at 23, Manigo v. New York City Housing Authority, supra.
See also Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957).
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A broader test has been suggested for determining the
constitutionality of conditions attached to any welfare benefits.47
The first question to be asked is: How relevant is the condition to
the benefit? Courts have invalidated conditions not rationally
related to the asserted purpose of welfare programs. It is seriously
doubtful that the following conditions originally established by the
NYCHA as grounds for determining undesirability are rationally
related to the asserted purposes of public housing: apparent mental
retardation of any member of the family; discharge from service
with other than an honorable discharge; obnoxious conduct during
-processing of application; unusually frequent changes in place of
residence; family with minor children which does not include both
parents; illegitimate children; placement of children with relatives
or agencies; husband or wife under 18 years of age; frequent
separation of husband and wife; and a highly irregular work
history. Moreover, the possibility that there exists a "less onerous
alternative" than imposing a condition which may infringe on
constitutional rights, may lead to a determination of
unconstitutionality."" Rather than imposing an undesirability
standard or establishing various conditions indicating
undesirability, public housing authorities should take on the
responsibility of housing and rehabilitating the permanent poor by
providing a new environment and establishing a larger and more
meaningful social services program.'
Denial of public housing based on undesirability would seem to
definitely fail two other parts of the suggested constitutionality test.
(i) What is the importance of the benefit to the individual recipient
being disqualified? (2) Does the private sector offer equivalent
benefits? The answer to the first question is obvious; numerous
reports and studies have underlined the importance of public
housing to this very group labelled "undesirable.' 5 Furthermore,
'1 O'Neil, Unconstitutonal Conditions: Weljare Bene/its with Strings Attached. 54
CA.IF. L. REV. 443 (J966).
H" Id. at 466-70. See. e.g.. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56
(1951): Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939). See also Wormuth & Mirkin. The
Doctrine oj the Reasonable Alternative. 9 UTAH L. REV. 254 (1964).
"'See PUBLIC HOUSING IS THE TENANTS, supra note 7. at 10- I.
'0 O'Neil, supra note 147, at 470. see, e.g., Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and
Wellare Assistance. 31 ALBANY L. REV. 210. 240 (1967); 53 CORNELL L. REV.. supra note
133. at 1135.
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several congressional declarations concerning public housing point
to the glaring lack of suitable private housing. Section 1401 of the
Housing Act sets forth the most fundamental goal of public
housing: "to remedy the unsafe and insanitary housing conditions
and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for
families of low income. . . that are injurious to the health, safety,
and morals of the citizens of the Nation.'1'
The last two parts of the test go to the form and clarity of the
condition and the procedure by which a possible recipient is denied
the benefit.' Many authorities do not publish-their regulations as
required by the ACC and the HAA Low Rent Management
Manual;'" thus an applicant is not apprised of the criteria he must
meet to become eligible. Further, when an applicant is rejected, he
is often not informed of the reasons or grounds.' Observers of the
NYCHA and other Authorities' procedures have related vivid
examples of the inadequate investigation upon which decisions are
based. In many cases, the decision to deny admission is made by
one person. Furthermore, in determining ineligibility, the Authority
commonly is not held to any burden of proof or evidentiary
standard. Applicants are frequently not afforded a hearing, the
right to confront their accusers, or the right to appeal within the
Authority.5 5 This lack of procedural due process will be discussed
in detail later; its significance here is the fact that, -placed within
this procedural context, the undesirability standard again seems to
fail the test of constitutionality. 6 Existing standards are often
vague, with "little in the way of procedure to make certain that the
authorities' information is true."'5 7 The argument in support of the
reasonableness of a general anti-social behavior standard is that
42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
, O'Neil, supria note 147, at 473-77.
" "The Local Authority shall duly adopt and promulgate, by publication or posting in a
conspicuous place for examination by prospective tenants, regulations establishing its
admission policies." PHA, ACC, supra note 15, Pt. 1, § 206 (April 1966); accord, Low-
RE."r MANAGEMENT MANUAL. supra note 22, § 3.5 (Oct. 1967); see 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(2)
(1964); Rosen, supra note 84, at 164-67.
'' See, e.g., Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 671, 675-76 (1967). See also
Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 269 (1969).
'-See 386 U.S. 670, 675-76.
' See notes 212.63 infra and accompanying text.
, Reich, Individual Rights and Social Weljire: The Emerging Legal Issues. 74 YALE
L.J. 1245, 1250 (1965).
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such screening is required to protect the morals, health, and welfare
of residents in the project. But what of tenants in private housing?
Is it not also the responsibility of government to protect the safety,
morals, health, and welfare of those citizens? Would it be
reasonable under this guise to deny private housing to this category
of undesirables? It seems far more reasonable, and, in the interests
of "protecting" the general public, to afford this "undesirable"
segment of our society an opportunity for rehabilitation through a
more wholesome public housing environment.
Furthermore, denying public housing to persons because of a
history of anti-social behavior is in effect a punishment for conduct
which is not necessarily criminal or, in cases where the conduct did
constitute a crime, a further penalty where society has already
exacted its punishment. Nor will this constitutional infirmity be
countered by merely alleging that public housing is a privilege and
not a right. "Increasingly," as one commentator has pointed out:
[W]hen the petitioner's primary interest in the public sector could
not be characterized as a "right" entitled to [substantive due
process protection] ...courts have nonetheless found some other
implicated right to sustain the claim. Alternatively, they have
granted relief through recourse to constitutional provisions which
operate irrespective of whether what is involved is deemed a
privilege, rather than a right.'
This examination of admission policies has attempted to show
that existing standards of admissibility, especially those relating to
desirability, are open to both constitutional and statutory purpose
attacks. The admission policies of the most Local Authorities are
totally discordant with the purpose of the national public'housing
program. "It makes little sense to deprive a poor family of perhaps
its only comfort-decent housing-because the extra mouth to feed
belongs to a bastard rather than a legitimate child,"'' or because
one member of the family many years before had committed an
"undesirable act."
The divergence of opinions on whether there should be a
desirability standard serves to underscore the widespread debate as
to the purpose of public housing-is it merely a stepping stone to
" Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law. 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1442 (1968).
'5' 53 CORNELL L. REV., 'supra note 133, at 1132.
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middle income housing, providing low-cost, decent housing to serve
the temporary poor, or is it a rehabilitative institution, serving as a
constructive force in the attempt to break the poverty cycle. Anti-
poverty programmers would seem to view its function as
rehabilitative.6 0 If so, and it is submitted that this is an accurate
appraisal, Local Authorities, their officials and managers, and even
public housing tenants must be educated as to the role of public
housing.
Alternatively, if it is felt that at the federal level, conceding
public housing's role in the anti-poverty program, a means of
screening and rejection is nevertheless 'required to weed 6ut those
who would be a definite and immediate danger to other tenants, the
desirability standard must be reexamined. A vague undesirability.
provision which leaves implementation completely to the discretion
of Authority officials should be abolished. If public housing is to
be denied because of extreme anti-social conduct, HAA should
dictate what specific factors are to be considered and a finding
should be required that such behavior is present and continuing, not
merely that a past indiscretion existed.
If it is felt that the health, safety, and moral well being of
tenants cannot be protected without this type of requirement, only
extreme social disorders, established by HAA guidelines as clearly
potentially harmful to the public housing community, should be
considered. If such a standard remains, clearly defined procedures,
including a right to a hearing, must be promulgated by the HAA
and uniformly adopted by all authorities to insure substantive and
procedural due process in each case. Local Authorities must heed
the admonition of HUD's circular, founded on the Thomas holding,
to establish regulations for admission and continued occupancy
which do not deny admission to certain classes and do not allow
eviction because of marital status or legitimacy.'6' Unless eligi-
bility standards which do not discriminate against the "problem
" See Remarks of Abner D. Silverman at Management Portion of the Rent Supplement
Program, FHA Director's Meeting, Washington, D.C.. May 10. 1966, reported in PUBLIC
HOUSING IS THE TENANTS, supra note 7, at 11; Weinandy, Working With the Poor, The
Report of a Three-Year Family Consultation Service in Public Housing, at 4-5 (Syracuse
Univ. Youth Development Center, 1965).
"' Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular (Dec. 17, 1968). See notes 259-63
infra and accompanying text for procedural recommendations.
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family" are instituted, the goals of public housing may very well
become illusory-long in rhetoric, but short in fulfillment.
Eviction. Unlike the nondesirability requirement applied in
admission cases, wherein it can be argued that past behavior should
not be used to deny a person the opportunity of receiving the
rehabilitative benefits of standard housing, there does exist an area
in which a local authority must be able to rid itself of a person
presently exhibiting disruptive characteristics in order to protect the
physical well-being and peaceful occupancy of its tenants.
The question then is whether or not the factors which give rise
to a determination of nondesirability are consonant with this
legitimate purpose. New York City's Tenant Review Board Hand-
book authorizes eviction for the following offenses or conditions
which are characterized as creating a "clear and present danger to
other tenants:" the sale of narcotics; heroin addiction; use of mari-
juana; membership in an anti-social violent gang (not based on
arrest); forcible or statutory rape; sexual deviation; and miscellaneous
clear and present danger situations such as tampering with elevator
controls, riding on top of elevators, tampering with mailboxes,
stealing mail, endangering passersby by throwing objects from
windows or roofs, armed robbery, mugging, and assault with a
dangerous weapon. 162
Undoubtedly, many of these acts could seriously affect the
physical and moral well-being of tenants and thus would be
legitimate grounds for eviction, but it is also arguable that in many
instances isolated acts of this nature do not necessarily result in a
clear and present danger. The serious defect in this standard is that
the Tenant Review Board is not required to establish an actual
causal connection between the act and the danger to tenant well-
being. The regulations thus have the effect of establishing a
conclusive presumption that certain acts constitute a clear and
present danger.13 Although the Board is admonished in certain
situations to consider mitigating factors such as a first offense and
the youth of the offender, 164 this is not an adequate substitute for a
1 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, MANAGEMENT MANUAL Ch. VI I; Tenant
Review Board Handbook. appendix B. at 7-10 (April 15, 1964).
'1 See P. Spriggs. supra note 142, at 8.
I" See NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY. MANAGEMENT MANUAL, ch. VII; Tenant
Review Board Handbook, appendix B. at 8 (April 15. 1964).
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clear establishment in each and every case that a particular action
actually constitutes a danger to tenants. Furthermore, except for
these situations, the clear and present danger guidelines do not
suggest or even allow for continued occupancy of the offender with
attempts at rehabilitation.
Under the established guidelines, one offense is sufficient to
constitute a clear and present danger. An "offense" is usually
established by an arrest; however, the Tenant Review Board in
deciding to evict is not required to await court disposition nor is it
bound by a court finding of acquittal.
A criterion for eviction which permits arrest alone to form a
basis for undesirability and which allows the Authority to disregard
an acquittal raises serious constitutional questions.. That a private
landlord can pursue proper legal methods to terminate his
relationship with a tenant who has an arrest record is basic, but
when the Government as a landlord pursues such action, it is
denying the individual, without due process of law, rights and
privileges which that Government has established.1 5
Regulations which permit an eviction based solely on proof of
behavior without a showing that such behavior is a source of
danger to the project or its tenants are inconsistent with the
objectives of public housing. In Sanders v. Cruise,t'6 a New York
court held that although NYCHA's nondesirability regulations
were reasonable, the Authority's application of the regulations to
evict a tenant on the ground that his adult son was a narcotics user
was unreasonable since the Attorney had failed to show that the
son's drug addiction was a source of danger to other tenants.'67 If
an Authority's action is unreasonable when it fails to prove the
causal nexus, then, a fortiori, a regulation which allows it to evict
without such proof is equally unreasonable and must fall. 6,
One category of nondesirability, the family which repeatedly
engages in disruptive behavior,'69 except for establishing illegitimate
I See notes 212-25 infra and accompanying text.
10 Misc. 2d 533, 173 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
Id. at 537, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
"'See New York City Housing Authority v. Watson, 27 Misc. 2d 618, 619-25, 207
N.Y.S.2d 920, 922-27 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (Hofstadter, J.. dissenting).
I" "Disruptive behavior" is subdivided by the Authority into the following classifications:
alcohol, boisterous conduct, friction or interference with employees, friction or interference
with neighbors, lack of parental control, neglect of children, out-of-wedlock children,
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children as a basis for eviction, seems substantively reasonable. It
requires a nexus between the behavior and interference with other
tenants or -the project, provides for an examination and review of
the total record, does not allow eviction based on isolated acts or
arrests, and makes relevant the locale of the alleged actions.t 0
The third category of nondesirability established by NYCHA is
the use of an apartment for illegal or immoral purposes,
specifically, abortion, prostitution, illegal manufacture or sale of
articles, and professional gambling. As a substantive matter, these
grounds seem legitimate and fair. Again, bowever, the danger lurks
that the application of this standard in individual cases is devoid of
procedural safeguards.
Another factor indicating undesirability, according to the
NYCHA, is the birth of out-of-wedlock children. 7' Although the
regulations seem to require that the occurrence of such births be
coupled with other evidence of disruptive behavior in order to
constitute nondesirability, other Authorities, through either
published or unpublished policies, have evicted tenants solely on the
ground of illegitimate births. 72 The denunciation in Thomast 3 of
the indiscriminate denial of admission to public housing, as
loitering, unacceptable housekeeping, vandalism, arrests (misdemeanors), marital disputes,
minor menial instability, senility, and unauthorized occupancy. Report of New York City
Housing Authority Tenant Review Board for 1964 § IV(B) (Apr. 15, 1964) (mimeographed)
[hereinafter cited as Tenant Review Board Report].
'70 See P. Spriggs, supra note 142.
'7 The birth of out-of-wedlock children is considered a form of "disruptive behavior."
Tenant Review Board Report, supra note 169, § I V(B)(8).
1 For example, the regulations originally promulgated by the Public Housing Authority
of Talladega, Alabama, which prompted the litigation in Lewis provided that "any
illegitimate child born to any member of a tenant family will automatically bring about the
eviction of that family. . . . [l]f it becomes apparent that a person is expecting an
illegitimate child, the family will be evicted immediately.. . . No exceptions will be made."
See Lewis v. Housing Authority, 397 F.2d 178, 179 n.I (5th Cir. 1968). The stated policy of
the Little Rock, Arkansas Housing Authority is that -[a] family shall not be eligible for
admission or continued occupancy if any family member residing regularly with the family
has a child or children born out of wedlock." Thomas v. Housing Authority, 282 F. Supp.
575. 578 (1967). This practice is often incorporated as a term of the lease. See Richardson v.
Housing Authority, Civil No. 678 (E.D.N.C. May 13, 1968). note 146 supra; Rosen, supra
note 84, at 230. Another example is found in the lease of the Housing Commission of
Ypsilanti, Michigan, which incorporates a provision of the Tenant's Handbook stating that
"[female heads of the family will not be permitted to increase their family while a resident
of the project. Increase in the family will be cause of eviction." See Williams v. Housing
Comm'n, Civil No. 28936 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 1966), noted in 7 WELFARE L. BULL. 5 (1967).
,n 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
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violative of equal protection and due process guarantees, would
seem to proscribe by analogy the automatic eviction of tenants who
give birth to illegitimate children.174 Furthermore, the wholesale
eviction or denial of admission because of illegitimate births not
only discriminates against the indigent mothers but also
discriminates against their children. Such discrimination without
fault is indisputably contrary to publish housing goals. Congress
could not have intended to exclude so large a portion of the poor
from public housing merely because they were born out of
wedlock t.17
Indeed, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Levy v.
Louisiana'76 indicates this discrimination is an unconstitutional
denial of equal protection. As in Levy, which involved a statute
denying illegitimate children the right to bring a wrongful death
action for the death of their mother, the fact of illegitimacy has no
connection with the claimed right or benefit . 77
Perhaps the clearest example of the Local Authority's arbitrary
and unrestrained power are the vague provisions found in leases
and Authority regulations which permit eviction for the violation of
114 Nevertheless, the courts continue to permit an Authority to give some evidentiary or
prsumptive effect to the presence of illegitimate children in determining initial and continued
eligibility for public housing. Such a policy was sanctioned in Thomas and seems to be the
present practice of the NYCHA. See 282 F. Supp. at 581; NEw YORK HOUSING AUTHORITY
MANAGEMENT MANUAL Ch. VII, Tenant Review Board Handbook, Appendix B, at 11
(April 15, 1964).
17 The unfairness of illegitimacy as a classification is illustrated by the following figures.
Estimated Ratio of Illegitimate Live Births to all Live Births Among Nonwhites for the
Year 1962. (Figures are totals per 1,000 live births.)
Totals in the United States 249.8 per thousand
Some states
Illinois 279.9 per thousand
Louisiana 219.1 per thousand
Missouri 291.2 per thousand
Ohio 224.7 per thousand
Pennsylvania 232.7 per thousand
Texas 222.7 per thousand
Washington, D.C. 278.4 per thousand
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, I 'VITAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S.: 1962, at
Table 1-24, p.1 - 19 . The rate of illegitimacy among poor non-whites is even higher. Among
families in Washington, D.C., with an income of less than $4,000, 38.2% of all live births are
illegitimate. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, INCOME.
EDUCATION, AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN NEIGHBORHOODS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (1964).
17 391 U.S. 68 (1968); see Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73
(1968). See also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
I" See 391 U.S. at 72.
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any condition or clause of the lease,18 "any applicable rule,
regulation or resolution of the authority," "the requirements or
directives of the Authority," "the requirements or directives of the
Authority," or for "noncooperation" with management.'79 The
references in these provisions are to a myriad of conditions of
varying importance, from playing baseball on project property to
subletting, but the violation of any one of them subjects the tenant
to eviction. Such provisions allow for purely arbitrary evictions. A
breach of a rule or regulation of the authority, or the condition or
rule itself, might be quite minor or technical; it may be
nonrecurring, but still it affords the Authority a "legal" basis for
eviction. Such a lease amounts to a tenancy terminable at the will
of the Authority, without notice in many cases, because it could
always find a technical or nominal "breach" or violation of one of
its innumerable lease conditions or rules and regulations.
The lack of reasonable guidelines or standards limiting eviction
to breaches or violations meeting a certain degree of severity would
seem to render such provisions too indefinite to be enforceable.'80
Furthermore, eviction pursuant to a nominal or insignificant breach
or violation is open to attack as both an arbitrary and capricious
decision, denying due process of law, and violating the equal
protection requirements of the Constitution. This principle was
recognized in Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment and Housing
Authority.8' There it was indicated that a slight breach of a lease
through a failure to report $99 in income would not support an
eviction when no other tenants were evicted in the past for minor
breaches of the same nature. Indeed, the real reason for the eviction
notice was found to be the plaintiff's activities in organizing fellow
tenants. The court concluded that the exercise of the first
amendment rights of freedom of speech and assembly "are too
valuable to be frittered away under the guise of breach of contract
based upon an ex parte computation of income . . ..
'IsSee, e.g., Housing Authority of New Orleans, Dwelling Lease, Form D-104, ' 3
(May I, 1960); National Capital Housing Authority, Dwelling Lease, NCHA 583. • 5
(Aug. 196 1).
"I New York City Housing Authority, Resolution Relating to Termination of Tenancy,
60-8-684, § 2.02(e) (Aug. 3, 1960).
I See Schoshinski, supra note 64, at 557. See generally I A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 95-
108 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON, CoNTrRACTS §§ 37-49 (3d ed. 1957).
M' 266 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Va. 1966).
112 Id. at 401. Cf Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 68-Civ. 4498 (E.D.N.Y., Mar. 25, 1969),
noted in 4 LEGAL AID DIGFST 18 (1969).
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The greatest boon to retaliatory eviction is the present practice
of most Authorities, sanctioned until recently by HAA, of
terminating the normal month-to-month tenancy without ascribing
a reason for the termination. This mode of termination is often
used to expedite eviction and circumvent procedural and evidentiary
problems in undesirability, anti-social, or disruptive behavior
cases. 183 The only limitation imposed by the courts on the power to
evict was that a Local Authority could not use a legally or
constitutionally invalid reason for eviction, if it stated one.""
To ameliorate the harshness of this federal sanction, the HAA
issued two circulars, the first strongly urged Local Authorities to
inform tenants of the reasons for the notice to quit""5 and the
second, a superseding circular, stated the "belief" of HAA that it
was essential to inform tenants of the reasons for their eviction!"6
It was this later circular which permitted the Supreme Court in
Thorpe v. Housing Authority'87 to sidestep the issue of whether a
Local Authority must give reasons for eviction. Instead, it
interpreted this circular, which was in fact issued by the HAA
during the Thorpe litigation, "to require local authorities to keep
future records of eviction, [and] the reasons therefore" and
indicated that a finding of compliance or noncompliance with the
procedures established by the circular would be dispositive of all
W See Friedman, supra note 4, at 6 61!
I" See, e.g., Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority. 266 F. Supp. 397
(E.D. Va. 1966); Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522
(1964); Peters v. New York City Housing Authority, 9 Misc. 2d 942, 128 N.Y.S.2d 224
(Sup. Ct. 1953), modi/ied, 283 App. Div. 801, 128 N.Y.S.2d 712 (2d Dept. 1954), rev'd on
other grounds. 307 N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954), appeal disnisssed on remand. I App.
Div. 2d 694, 147 N.Y.S.2d 859 (2d Dept. 1955); Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis.
269, 70 N.W.2d 605, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955). See also Rudder v. United States,
226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Housing Authority v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279
P.2d 215 (1955), cert. denied. 305 U.S. 969 (1956); Kutcher v. Housing Authority, 20 N.J.
181, 119 A.2d I (1955). See generally Rosen, supra note 84, at 182-223.
113 Public Housing Administration, Circular (May 31, 1966). "There is as you may be
aware growing opposition and challenge from individuals and organizations to the practice
of simply giving the statutory notice without stating the reason or reasons therefor. In
connection with the above practice, we strongly urge, as a matter of good social policy, that
Local Authorities in a private conference inform any tenants who are given such notices of
the reasons for this action." Id.
1 Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular (Feb. 7, 1967). See also Thorpe v.
Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
,W 386 U.S. 670 (1967) (per curiam).
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eviction proceedings which had not yet become final.l For a time
a question persisted as to the binding effect of this circular, as well
as other federal directives in the public housing field, but the second
Thorpe decision held the circular to be a mandatory directive.'89
In Lewis v. Housing Authority,'"° the Fifth Circuit may have
lent some support to the proposition that the mere issuance of
modifying regulations will not preclude a court from examining the
validity of a policy of evictions without notice. The plaintiffs,
Negro residents of a Talladega, Alabama public housing project,
sought to enjoin the Authority from continuing to enforce its policy
of automatically evicting any family having, or expecting, an
illegitimate child, and continuing to evict or threaten to evict
tenants without reason and a fair hearing and from pursuing
several discriminatory practices.' Although the Authority had
revoked the eviction of the plaintiffs who brought the suit, the court
found that:
the issues raised .. .must be passed on initially by-the Trial
Court. Though the present threat of eviction to appellants has been
lifted, . . . [the] [a]ppellants' charge of unconstitutionality of the
new eligibility rule must also be passed on." 2
In conclusion, the Lewis court stated that "[tjhe case is not moot
because ,there remains subject matter on which the judgment of the
court can and must operate."'' 3 Analogizing to that opinion it
might well be argued that where the only prophylactic interposed to
prevent eviction without notice and possible infringement of first
amendment rights is an HAA "suggested" circular, the case should
I Id. at 672-73. On remand, the Sitpreme Court of North Carolina held that the HUD
directive has no retroactive force and that the Local Authority therefore had no duty to afford
the defendant-tenant notice of the reasons for her eviction and a hearing on those reasons.
Housing Authority v. Thorpe, 271 N.C. 468, 157 S.E.2d 147 (1967).
I' Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969). The Court originally deferred
decision on this issue, and opinions varied as to the legal efficacy and enforceability of such
directives. 386 U.S. at 677-81 (Douglas, J., concurring); Rosen, supra note 84, at 207-10.
The Housing Law Center, Earl Warren Legal Institute of Berkeley, California is currently
researching whether HUD can impose procedural reforms on local housing authorities.
Letter from Myron Moskovitz, Chief Attorney, Housing Law Center, Earl Warren Legal
Institute, Berkeley, California, to all legal services project directors, Aug. 21, 1968.
'"397 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1968).
I Id. at 178-79.
Id. at 181.
Id.
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not be declared moot without at least testing the effect of the
circular.
A recent New York State Supreme Court opinion represents an
even further break from the courts' traditional sanctioning of
public housing evictions without cause or prior notice. Vinson v.
Greenburgh Housing AuthorityM4 re-examined the whole nature of
the relationship between Public Housing Authorities and their
tenant clientele. Relying on the state constitution's recognition of
low-rent housing as a proper govermental function and
implementation by the legislature's enactment of public housing
programs, the court held that even though the traditional notions of
private property might otherwise be applied, low-rent housing
"imports a status of a continuous character" and "[w]hat may be
complete freedom of action under private contractual arrangements
falls to restricted action under public housing leases."'' 9 Thus,
housing authorities cannot oust a tenant merely by arlitrarily
enforcing the termination provision in the lease.'96 In reaching this
conclusion, the court quoted at length Mr. Justice Douglas'
concurring opinion in Thorpe I; especially relevant was the following
section:
It is not dispositive to maintain that a private landlord might
terminate a lease at his pleasure. Fot this is government . . . and
the actions of government are circumscribed by the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment. "The government as landlord is
still the government. It must not act arbitrarily, for, unlike private
landlords, it is subject to the requirements of due process of law.
Arbitrary action is not due process."' 97
Unfortunately, such reasoning is certainly far from accepted.
Faced with a generally non-directional legislative and regulatory
background, the Local Authorities have seized the initiative and
adopted various eviction practices, some clearly enunciated and
others resulting from unpublished policies. Because of the absence
of clear federal guidelines setting out permissible grounds for, and
procedures to be followed in, eviction, the danger of arbitrary, ad
hoc disqualifications made by single individuals or small groups of
M 29 App. Div. 2d 338, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1968).
M Id. at 341, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
IN Id.
11 Id. at 344, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
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management officials is ever-present."" A number of Authorities
have no published eviction policy and procedure, and arbitrary
practices do not come to light unless they are questioned by
aggrieved tenants. Often the low income tenant is reluctant or ill
equipped, even in this age of increased legal aid to the indigent, to
defend against such an eviction."' But at present this remedy seems
to be the only one open to him. When Thorpe came before the
Supreme Court again, it was held that the HUD circular ® was
mandatory in requiring that the Local Authority give the tenant the
reason for his eviction, 01 but the constitutionality of the reason had
to be challenged in ensuing eviction proceedings 22
Even after Thorpe II, however, significant questions arising
from the circular 23 are left unanswered. As noted by Mr. Justice
Douglas in Thorpe I, the circular is silent as to what reasons will
support an eviction. 24 Furthermore, tenants may be unable to
interpose constitutional defenses at eviction proceedings under rules
of local practice0 5 Finally, the marked reluctance shown by the
HAA before Thorpe II to enforce the circular's avowed policy26
may continue.
""See Note, Public Landlords and Private Tenants: The Eviction of "'Undesirables"
front Public Housing Projects. 77 YALE L.J. 988, 994 (1968).
-- Id. at 993.
20 Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular (Feb. 7, 1967); 393 U.S. at 272-
73 n.8.
393 U.S. at 283-84.
SId.
20 Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular (Feb. 7, 1967); 393 U.S. at 272-
73 n.8.
uSee 386 U.S. at 677-78.
20 See Rosen, supra note 84, at 198-203. In New York, for example, the courts have
refused to look beyond the 30 day notice to terminate, holding that the tenancy is governed
by the lease and the lease provides for termination in this manner. E.g., New York City
Housing Authority v. Russ, I Misc. 2d 170, 134 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1954). But a New
York statute provides that a landlord in a city with a population over one million who
attempts to evict a tenant in a summary proceeding pursuant to a lease provision permitting
termination for objectionable conduct may do so only if he can prove objectionableness by
competent evidence presented in court. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcToNs LAW § 711 (McKinney
1963). If the HUD circular, Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular (Feb. 7,
1967), is followed and the Authority gives a reason for termination with the 30 day notice,
the question then will be whether the landlord-tenant court may inquire as to the
reasonableness and propriety of the decision.
2w Cahn & Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunity. 81 HARv. L. REV. 929 (1968), reports
that communication with HAA officials indicated that HAA was unwilling to define the
legal status of the circular or to state whether it had the power to make it legally binding;
[Vol. 1969: 399
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Traditionally courts have sanctioned eviction without a legal
reason. The only established judicial inroads in combatting this
practice have been in cases where the underlying reason prompting
eviction has been adjudged to be unconstitutional or contrary to
public policy 07 Thus, an indigent tenant evicted without cause
must discover a retaliatory motive on the part of the Authority and
then persuade a court that this motive violates his constitutional
rights-an onerous burden indeed. It is submitted that eviction
without cause should be treated as a per se violation of due process
and that the burden of showing cause should be placed on the
shoulders of the Authority.2 °s
Recommendations
Standardized and uniform rules. As 'a first step in imposing
definite eviction rules upon Local Authorities, HUD should imple-
ment its circular of February 7, 1967 which provided that a public
housing lease can be terminated by the Local Authority only for
cause. Such a provision should be included in the lease thus making
the tenancy one for an indefinite or indeterminate term with the
tenant permitted to terminate upon giving reasonable notice.
Substantive grounds for lease termination. It has been suggested
that the reasons for eviction should be limited to those 'ommonly
refused to publish the circular in the Federal Register under the Freedom of Information
Act; was unwilling to make an investigation to determine whether the circular was being
followed; and declined to clarify the grounds upon which tenants may be evicted. Id. at 964-
65. Thus, the article concludes, this refusal to act may result in evictions "which directly
subvert other HAA policies." Id.
20 See note 184 supra and accompanying text. The most recent pronouncement of this
principle is in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals' landmark decision of
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968). "[W]hile the landlord may evict for any
legal reason or for no reason at all, he is not . . . free to evict in retaliation for his tenant's
report of housing code violations to the authorities. As a matter of statutory construction
and for reasons of public policy, such an eviction cannot be permitted." Id. at 699.
2" To date, only one court has embraced this rationale. In Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing
Authority, 29 App. Div. 2d 338, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1968), the court held that traditional
notions of private property cannot be applied to low-rent housing; rather, public tenancy
imports a status of continuous character based on the needs of tenants for decent housing at
a cost proportionate to their income and subject to compliance by the tenants with
reasonable regulations. The declared purpose of the low-rent housing statute, said the court,
makes it clear that so long as tenants remain qualified and do not violate reasonable
regulations of the state agency, they may not be evicted for grounds "extrinsic to these
requirements." Id. at 342, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
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accepted in the private housing sector 2°9-those recognized at
common law and under statutory summary proceedings for the
premature termination of a fixed period tenancy. Absent a lease
clause on the subject the common law recognized the lessor's power
to terminate an estate for years upon the lessee's use of the
premises in an illegal manner, for an illegal purpose, or in a
manner constituting a nuisance. t0 "Common-law" legislation"'
and more recent statutes also provide for forfeiture of an estate for
waste either permitted or committed by a tenant for years.
The usual ground for terminating a tenancy in summary
proceedings is non-payment of rent. This legal cause should be
ameliorated in public housing tenancies. The legislature should
recognize the often recurring financial straits of low-income public
housing tenants and institute a partial payment or late payment
plan to accommodate tenants who are experiencing financial
difficulties arising from causes other than their own personal
neglect, frivolity, or mismanagement. This ground for termination
should be limited to chronic non-payment of rent resulting from
gross tenant irresponsibility.
These substantive standards would preclude the Authority
management from judging the moral worthiness or fitness of its
tenants,.a practice entirely alien to the objective of providing safe,
decent, sanitary houslihg for all. The argument has been made,
however, that this restriction on management's power would
seriously threaten the efficient operation and economic viability of
the project. If this is true, the answer is two-fold; first, a successful
public housing program requires substantial infusion of
rehabilitative social services-just providing adequate physical
facilities will not rehabilitate our poor-and, second, the economic
viability and financial independence of local housing projects may
not be consonant with the overall objectives of the housing and anti-
poverty programs.
' See Rosen, supra note 84, at 215-16; Bill of Rights for Public Housing Tenants § 11(3)
(July 5, 1967) (prepared by an ad hoc committee of Legal Services attorneys at the request
of the OEO Legal Services Division).
"'See 2 R. POWELL. THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 24711], at 372 (1967).
2,, Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. i, c. 5 (1278). Contra Worthington Motors v. Crouse,
80 Nev. 160, 390 P.2d 229 (1964).
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III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Any proposed resolution of the substantive problems in public
housing will be futile if it does not provide for due process
safeguards. Making management the sole judge of nuisance, waste,
and substantial interference with fellow tenants would merely be
giving it another license for arbitrary action. The right of the
tenant to notice of the evidence against him, as well as the right to
a reasonable opportunity to rebut that evidence are fundamental
safeguards, necessarily available to those who deal with
government, against the impersonality inherent in any large public
or private organization 2t
For example, if HUD were to declare that income was to be the
sole criterion for determining eligibility for admission and
continued tenancy, tenants were not apprised of this declaration,
and the Local Authority continued to be the sole judge of eligibility
without adequate provisions for an independent review of its
determination or notice of pending action, such a declaration would
clearly be of little value to public housing dwellers. Presently,
however, admissions, evictions, and other determinations potentially
adverse to the tenants' interests are usually decided without the
benefit of published guidelines, adequate notice of the charges
against the tenant, an established evidentiary standard of burden of
proof, a review by an impartial tribunal, and often without an
opportunity to appear before, and be heard by, the officials who
make these decisions.
This study has catalogued the areas in which tenants' rights and
liabilities are decided on a purely discretionary ex parte basis.
These arbitrary practices, in large measure, are the result of the
federal policy of vesting complete, and nearly unreviewable,
discretion in the Local Authorities. The substantive illegality of
these policies has been dealt with above; this section will discuss the
application of procedural due process to Local Authority
determinations.
The Constitutional Basis
Since public housing authorities are government agencies, their
activities must conform with due process of law. Both state and
22 Reich, supra note 157, at 1253.
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federal courts have recognized that federally-funded,2 1 3 state-created
housing authorities are subject to the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The principle was well-stated by the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Rudder v. United
StatesP In rejecting the claim that a housing authority has the
same freedom to evict tenants as a private landlord, the court said:
The government as landlord is still the government. It must not
act arbitrarily, for, unlike private landlords, it is subject to the
requirements of due process of law. Arbitrary action is not due
process.2!1
Similarly, in Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Authority,15 a New
York court held that state action in the housing sphere was
necessarily subject to the same constitutional commands applicable
to any governmental function.
Due process applies to the granting of a privilege as well as to
the withdrawal of a right.21 7 Thus, in Holmes v. New York.City
Housing Authority218 where several public housing applicants
challenged the admission procedures of the NYCHA, the Second
Circuit held that the plaintiffs set out a sufficient claim for relief
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, stating
that due process required selection to be made in accordance with
"ascertainable standards" since "uncontrolled discretion" would
be an "'intolerable invitation to abuse. 2 19
Similarly, the developing case law clearly indicates that ex parte
determinations of ineligibility for government benefits are
unconstitutional. The interested party must be given the basis for
21 But see Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Authority, 29 App. Div. 2d 338, 345, 288
N.Y.S.2d 159, 167 (1968) (due process requirements apply even if not federally funded).
2226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
215 Id. at 53.
21 "Due process of law is not confined to judicial proceedings, but extends to every case
which may deprive a citizen of life, liberty, or property, whether the proceedings be judicial,
administrative, or executive in its nature. [Citation omitted.] Once the State embarks into the
area of housing as a function of government, necessarily that function, like other
governmental functions, is subject to the constitutional commands." 29 App. Div. 2d at 346-
41. 288 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
'", See. e.g.. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232 (1957); Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Woods v.
Wright. 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
21, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
21, Id. at 265.
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the decision, adequate notice, and an opportunity to rebut
unfavorable information n0
Due process traditionally encompasses at least the following
requirements: adequate notice of specific charges,.22 a hearing by
impartial officials,m an opportunity to present evidence,22 a right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,' and a decision
based upon evidence presented and tested at the hearing.2 5 Current
public housing practices when measured against these standards are
found to be wanting in almost every respect.
Present Practices
Eviction. Many Authorities have no guidelines for eviction
procedures. 26 Thus, public housing tenants faced with possible
eviction for nondesirability are seldom fully apprised of the nature
of'the charges against them or given an opportunity to defend
against the charges. Those Authorities that have established
eviction procedures often fail to provide a fair hearing. For
example, the NYCHA administers nondesirability evictions through
an eight-member Tenant Review Board.22 7 A project manager
initates the procedures, informing the tenant by letter that his
misconduct seriously jeopardizes continued occupancy and
requesting the tenant to appear for an interview. If he feels eviction is
warranted, the project manager may formally recommend
2"See Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1962); note 212 supra and accompanying text.
21 In re Gault, 387 U.S. i, 31-34 (1967); Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness,
373 U.S. 96, 105 (1963); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied. 368 U.S.
930 (1962).
2 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1955); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807,
812 (2d Cir. 1967); Amos Treat v. SEC. 306 F.2d 260, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
" Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
22 Wilner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1963); Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 506-08 (1959); Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 275 (1949).
2 Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 169-70 (1962); Gonzalez v.
Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1964); In re United Corp., 249 F.2d 168, 179-80 (3d
Cir. 1957).
= See notes 153, 199 supra and accompany text. See generally Comment, Eviction
Procedures in Public Housing. 73 DiCK. L. REV. 307 (1969).
22 The description herein of the NYCHA procedure for nondesirability evictions is taken
from an excellent paper prepared by P. Kent Spriggs for Prof. Charles Ares' Seminar on the
Indigent and the Law, New York University School of Law. See P. Spriggs, supra note 142.
Vol. 1969: 399]
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
termination of occupancy to the Tenant Review Board, notifying
the tenant of his recommendation 2 8 The Board then summarily
considers the recommendation and record.2 9 Although the tenant is
not present, if the initial hearing results in eviction, the tenant is
afforded the opportunity of review before a three-member panel of
the Board with its decision being final3P0
Panel hearings are informal. Although the tenant may be
represented by a lawyer or social worker, rules of evidence do not
apply. The evidence against the defendant, secured from the dossier
forwarded by the project manager, is essentially hearsay, with most
of the entries being complaints of tenants, or Authority officials.
Since Authority policy prohibits the accused from learning the
identity of complainants, little practical opportunity is afforded the
tenant to attack the substance or source of the charges. Although
the Tenant Review Board Handbook instructs project managers to
corroborate complaints, and gives tenants the opportunity of
defense before record entry is made, project managers 'have
admittedly fallen short of this goal.131 In addition, tenants are
frequently saddled with the task of rebutting an apparent
presumption among Board members that low income tenants
cannot be believedP 2
If the panel determines the case is ineligible for remand to the
full board, and the Board Chairman approves the finding, the
tenant is then served with notice to vacate in one month.. Failure to
so vacate will result in summary eviction proceedings, with the
court usually giving the tenant from three to six months to vacate.
During this grace period the manager can observe the family's
behavior and choose either to enforce the court order or Ilow the
family to remain for up to one year. At that time he may either
enforce the eviction order or refer the case back to the Board with
a recommendation that the family be allowed to remain in the
project. However, this grace period and opportunity for
reconsideration is of doubtful benefit to the tenant, since most
= Id. at 22.
I' id. at 23.
I d. at 24.
n, Id. at 24-25.
z Id. at 26.
id. at 26-27.
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tenants will leave the premises before summary proceedings are
commenced rather than remain as "tenants at will.' 23
The NYCHA eviction procedure was chosen for discussion
herein because it is generally considered one of the most detailed
and "liberal."2' As the above description illustrates, however, it
fails to meet the requirements of procedural due process. An
administrative proceeding need not be surrounded by all the
safeguards of a trial, but certain minimal requirements must be
met. First, the affected party must be given notice that sufficiently
explains the charge so as to enable him to prepare a defense. In the
NYCHA Board hearing "notice" is merely a theoretical
requirement, a vague explanation of the grounds of undesirability
and a brief statement of the case. In one proceeding the statement
of the case was the "[a]ctivities of your children"m-hardly an
adequate explanation of the Board's policy. When the Board
reviews any determination, it has before it a written summary of
the tenant's misbehavior. The tenant could conceivably be sent such
a summary, although at present neither the tenant nor his counsel,
if he has one, is given a copy.
A second basic element of a fair hearing is the right to cross-
examine and confront adverse witnesses, traditionally the most
effective judicial tool for discovering truth and exposing
falsehoods. The Supreme Court has indicated that due process of
law requires proper safeguards in any administrative proceeding in
which "governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding
determinations which directly affect the legal rights of
individuals.''26
The Local Authorities, however, argue that confrontation must
be displaced for two higher values-the necessity of protecting
informers from possible reprisals and the desire to avoid placing an
overwhelming administrative burden on the Board.27 The tenant's
interest in a reasonable opportunity to rebut the charges against
him should be balanced against these values. One possible
2" For a comparison to the NYCHA procedures, see Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386
U.S. 670 (1967) (North Carolina).
20 See P. Spriggs, supra note 142, at 33.
2 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 422 (1960); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-
97 (1959).
n See P. Spriggs, supra note 142, at 26, 37.
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compromise would be to require the presence of the project
manager at Board hearings. Since the manager has some first-hand
knowledge of the issues, subjecting him to cross-examination would
likely aid in reaching a fair factual determination. Although the
NYCHA has rejected this suggestion on the ground that the burden
on the managers would be unreasonable, there is substantial
evidence to the contraryP8
Admission. Like the eviction process, the procedures for
determining eligibility for admission to public housing are nearly
devoid of due process. Although the ACC requires that "[tihe local
Authority shall duly adopt and promulgate, by publication or
posting in a conspicuous place for examination by prospective
tenants regulations establishing its admission policies,"' ' " applicants
for public housing frequently are unable to discover the Local
Authority's admission criteria. In addition, the determination of
eligibility for admission is made on an ex parte basis, leaving little
room for challenge or review. While a hearing may be available for
tenants threatened with eviction on grounds of undesirability, most
Authorities provide no similar review procedure to applicants
denied housing on similar grounds 40
Recent judicial challenges to arbitrary admission procedures in
New York 4' prompted the NYCHA to revise its regulations for
admission 4 Under the new procedures the applicant must be given
a notice containing the reasons for denial or deferral of his request
for admission to public housing and informing the applicant that
he may request a personal interview for explanation of the reasons
for the admission determination. The new procedure also provides
that each applicant who appears for an explanation must be
informed that he may submit additional information and may
request reconsideration of the admission decision 4 3 If the applicant
requests reconsideration his case is reviewed'by the NYCHA Chief
of Tenant Selection and Chief of Social Service Division who, in
21 Id. at 37.
2' See Rosen, supra note 84, at 165.
2 0 Id. at 169-70.
24! See. e.g.. Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
242 New York City Housing Authority, Revised Standards for Admission of Tenants, GM-
1632 (May 9. 1968), revising GM-1287 (Nov. 29, 1961).
242 Id. at 4. Note that if a tenant does not request an interview for a fuller explanation of
his ineligibility he will be uriaware that he is entitled to reconsideration.
[Vol. 1969:399
PUBLIC HOUSING
turn, may declare the family eligible, continue the finding of
ineligibility, continue or initiate deferral, or reopen the case for
further evaluation. If they disagree, the case is referred to the
Tenant Review Board for final determination. 24'
Redress of Grievances
Procedural due process is nonexistent in the redress of public
housing tenants' grievances. This is illustrated by the unavailability
of administrative machinery through which a tenant might seek to
have substandard housing conditions rectified or arbitrary
management practices reviewed.2 11 Whether it is a problem of
project disrepair, or a problem of an ex parte imposition of fines
for violation of project regulations, the tenant uniformly finds a
lack of impartial consideration and review. Although theoretically
the tenant can petition the HAA for redress of a grievance, or seek
review of HAA inaction under the Administrative Procedure Act,26
it is fairly clear that as a practical matter these remedies are
inadequate.24
Since judicial involvement is not economically feasible, a
possible solution would be to encourage Local Authorities to seek
improvement of the lines of communication between tenant and
management 4' as well as to recognize tenant organizations or
unions.2 1' Congress indicated a desire for tenant involvement in this
type of governmental programw by specifying in the Economic
Opportunity Act of 196421 "that community action programs
generally should be-conducted 'with the maximum feasible
participation of the residents of the areas.' ,,252 Preference for
grants was given to "programs which give promise of effecting a
permanent increase in the capacity of individuals, groups, and
24A Id.
m See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964).
U? See notes 44-74 supra and accompanying text (Private remedies for sub-standard
Public Housing section).
242 The extent of this power is another issue. See Dep't of. Housing and Urban
Development, Circular (Mar. 22, 1968).
2See 77 YALE L.J., supra note 80, at 1399-1400.
See id. at 1392-93.
's 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2981 (1964).
2 77 YALE L.J.. supra note 80, at 1392.
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communities to deal with their problems without further
assistance." ' Tenant involvement would seem to advance this
congressional purposes and, in providing an effective mode of
communication of tenant grievances to project management and
administration,.5 permit an economical and fair mode of 'grievance
settlement, thereby correcting the want of due process inherent in
ex parte determinations of project tenant grievancesP 6
Conclusion
Both state and federal courts are beginning to acknowledge the
constitutional deficiences in ex parte decisions that may adversely
affect the beneficiaries of government programs 7 In Thorpe II, the
Court required that adequate notice of and the reason for eviction
be given the tenant, but did not provide the tenant a meaningful
opportunity to contest the reason for arbitrary evictions.?8 The
H U D circular is a first step in the right direction; however, agency
regulations or new legislation should clarify this procedure and
make it enforceable. The Local Authorities should be compelled
to adopt formalized standards for admission and eviction pursuant to
established guidelines and subject to federal approval.
Recommendations
1. One solution would be the mandatory use by public housing
authorities of hearings which embody due process guarantees. Such
hearings would be held before an impartial board having
jurisdiction over all issues involving tenant-management relations.
Adequate notice and preparatory devices should be guaranteed the
- 42 U.S.C. § 2785(d) (1964). See 77 YALE L.J., supra note 80, at 1392.
" See 77 YALE L.J., suprq note 80, at 1369 n.9. The Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation, as lessor of foreclosed properties, signed a three-year contract with a
tenant union in Illinois. Also, HUD approved a public housing lease which recognizes a
tenant union and establishes formal grievance machinery for a project in Michigan. Id.
Id. at 1369, 1374-76. But see Strauss, Tenant Unions: Special Privilege Outside the
Law. 32 J. PROP. MANAGEMENT 129 (1967).
21 Angevine. The Poor and Public Housing (Law & Poverty Project, Boston Univ. School
of Law, Jan. 6. 1967). in OEO LEGAL SERVICES NOTEBOOK 4.21-37 (Jan. 1968). JOINT
COMM. ON PUBLIC HOUSING. PUBLIC HOUSING FOR CLEVELAND CITIZENS 21 (undated) (report
on the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority).
11' See, e.g., Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968);
Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Authority, 29 App. Div. 2d 338 (1968).
= c: notes 241.42 supra and accompanying text.
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tenant, and the hearing should be conducted in a formal manner
using established rules of evidence, with an adequate record being
kept of the proceedings. The availability of judicial review is also
necessary.25'
2. Judicial review of the day-to-day determinations of Local
Authority officials would be cumbersome, expensive, and time-
consuming. Arbitration, on the other hand, is cheaper, faster, and
requires less legal expertise to function properly. The arbitrators
either could be professionals or representation on the arbitration
board could be divided between management and tenants. The
former approach is espoused by a model lease developed by The
Joint Committee on Public Housing (in Cleveland),8 0 which
provides for compulsory binding arbitration of all controversies
relating to the lease except those arising from non-payment of rent.
Determination and award by the arbitrator is a condition precedent
to judicial action.25
3. Still another possible solution is the establishment of tenant
unions in the project housing area and the use of a grievance panel
or committee composed of union and project management
officials. 26 2 Experiments in the private housing sector have proved
a' See notes 245-47 supra and accompanying text.
JOINT COMM. ON PUBLIC HOUSING, supra note 256. In the case of nonpayment of rent.
the tenant may request arbitration. Id. The following is a model adminisirative hearing that
satisfies all requirements of procedural due process. The Massachusetts legislature recently
passed two bills which grant at least minimal due process rights to public housing tenants.
The first prohibits the termination of tenancies of public housing tenants unless cause is
shown and unless the tenant has been granted a hearing. The bill provides that:
The tenancy of a tenant of a housing authority shall not be terminated without cause
and without reasons therefore given to said tenant in writing. A tenant at his request
shall, except in the case of nonpayment of rent, be granted a hearing by the housing
authority at least 15 days prior to any such determination. The housing authority's
determination of cause shall be reviewable in the district court whenever an action for
summary process is brought for possession of the premises. MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 121, § 43 (Supp. 1968).
For the second bill, see note 262 infta.
211 JOINT COMM. ON PUBLIC HOUSING, supra note 256, at 32-33.
2 For a substantially similar approach see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 121, § 44 (Supp.
1968). The Massachusetts legislature gave the following recognition and protection to
tenants' organizations:
A housing autliority or its designee shall meet at reasonable times with tenant
organizations to confer about complaints and grievances; provided, that if there is more
than one tenant organization in any housing project, said authority or its designee
shall not be obliged to meet with more than two organizations in each project which
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successful where landlord and tenant have agreed on the scope of
such a procedure.2 3
IV. UNFAIR MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
Great injustices exist in the day-to-day management of public
housing projects due to the almost unlimited discretion of the Local
Authority in this area. Tenants' complaints of arbitrary practices
include: fees and charges imposed on tenants for infraction of
project rules,2 64 for late payment of rent, or for "key loans" when
tenants have locked themselves out; assessments for repairs when
no culpability on the part of the tenant has been established;265
repair charges added to rent, thereby subjecting tenants to
summary eviction for failure to pay such charges; threats of illegal
eviction; invasion of privacy of tenants' dwellings; inadequate
utility- allowances in leases resulting in added charge to tenants;66
charging of security deposits; and ineffectively promulgated rules
and regulations.26 7 A major cause of these widespread'practices is
the lack of administrative guidelines for management. The H U D
guidelines are restricted to technical, clerical, or record-keeping
assistance. More specific standards may be imposed at the local
level; generally, however, managers are given considerable latitude
and power in running the project.'
Another major source of irritation is the structure of the graded
rent system 66 Tenants resent paying a large percent of their pay
represent, as the housing authority may determine, the largest numbers of tenants in
that project. The housing authority shall inform the tenant organizations of its
decisions on any matter presented. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 121, § 43 (Supp.
1968).
See also 12 WELFARE L. BULL. 9 (1968).
20 Davis & Schwartz. supra note 80, at 112-15, 149-51.
2" See Friedman, supra note 4, at 659, 663.
"I5 Often damage has been done by vandals or repairs are necessitated by normal
depreciation and wear and tear.
26, In response to a suit by tenants who alleged that they had been charged up to $100 in
the winter quarter for excess use of gas, the NCHA announced that it was henceforth
abolishing such excess charges and that it would absorb future costs without a raise in rents.
Washington Post, Sept. 20, 1968, § B. at 4, col. I.
20 Tenant dissatisfaction with these "fines" for transgressions that are not malum in se is
heightened in many cases by the vagueness of the regulation and a lack of notice of its
issuance. See notes 226-44 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the procedural
due process problems in management practice.
21 PUBLIC HOUSING IS ThE TENANTS, supra note 7, at 29.
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increases for additional rent.269 Charging back rent to tenants who
fail to report income increases, including the income of secondary
wage earners in computing rents, and using the same rent scale for
older dwellings as for newer, more desirable dwellings are other
sources of resentmentP0 To reduce the confusion and irritation
caused by rent adjustment, management should conduct income
checks and make reassessments on an annual basis rather than
requiring tenants to report interim changes in income. In addition,
modifications are needed regarding secondary income in order to
provide greater incentive to increase family income
71
General Responsibility Jbr Management
Although HUD's Management Manual, a mandatory directive,
sets guidelines for income limits, rents, and eligibility standards for
continued occupancy, the day-to-day management of public
housing projects is within the almost exclusive jurisdiction and
discretion of the Local Authority. 2 The Housing Act confers upon
local public housing agencies "the maximum amount of
responsibility in the administration of the low-rent housing
program . . . . ,,7 HUD's advisory directive, The Local Housing
Authority Handbook, describes the role of the Local Authority as
that of a private landlord charged with complete management
responsibility. 4
Similarly, state enablin'g legislation vests in the Local
Authorities the responsibility for complete operation of public
housing projects.2 7 5 Although the regulations of some Local
"' They also resent being evicted for "overincome."
27 PUBLIC HOUSING IS THE TENANTS, supra note 7. at 29.
nI Id. at 30-31; Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular (Mar. 22, 1968).
27 HUD's definition of "rent schedules" may have some relevance in determining the
legality of adding charges for repairs to a tenant's rent. See Low-RENT MANAGEMENT
MANUAL, supra note 22, § 3.3(e) (Oct. 1967).
- 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964). The ACC's only admonition to Local Authorities is that their
operation fulfill the objectives "of providing decent, safe and sanitary dwellings . . . within
the financial reach of families of low income ... in such a manner as to promote
serviceability, efficiency, economy and stability." PHA, ACC. supra note 15, § 201.
n The HANDBOOK does deal specifically with several of the problems enumerated above,
such as charges for damages, setting of rents and rent collection. Outside of these areas,
however, the Handbook's role seems limited to rendering technical assistance and advice to
Local Authorities on such matters as manner of repair and maintenance. See PUBLIC HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION, LOCAL HOUSING AUTHORITY MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, Pt. I. § 7, 1 4
(Aug. 1963).211 See HOUSING ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION DRAFt ENABLING ACT § 8(b) (1965).
Vol. 1969: 399]
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
Authorities are detailed and specific in the areas of admission and
eviction, other areas are marked by a complete lack of guidelines
for daily operation?6
Assessment of Fees and Charges
Cost of repairs. A common, if not universal, practice of project
management is the assessment of the cost of repairs necessitated by
the tenant's failure to maintain their individual units in a proper
manner. Although this practice has direct federal sanction and
encouragement," 7 repairs made necessary by reasonable wear and
tear are excepted from assessment.2 18 A common allegation of
public housing tenants, however, is that charges are made for
repairs necessitated by normal depreciation and for damages
resulting from external causes, such as vandalism, over which the
tenant had no control?9 Another recurrent complaint is that while
the tenant may be responsible for the damage, the charge is
determined and levied without a right of hearing for the tenant or a
review from the decision of a single management official. The
determination of culpability is made, if at all, by the maintenance
personnel who make the repair. Since these charges are normally
added to rent, a tenant is subjected.to dispossession if he fails to
pay them. This collection procedure does not seem to be authorized
at the federal level.2 ° The Local Authority's basis for this practice
is a clause in the lease by which the tenant agrees to pay such
charges "as additional rent."28'
The practice of assessing the tenant the cost of repairs and
adding the charge to rent has no parallel in the private landlord-
'See PUBLIC HOUSING IS THE TENANTS, supra note 7, at 36; JOINT COMM, ON PUBLIC
HOUSING, supra note 256, at 19.
2" LOCAL AUTHORITY HANDBOOK, supra note 24, Pt. I1. § 6, 3(a) (Feb. 1966).
"id.
' See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 8, Humphrey v. New York City Housing Authority, Civil No. 4236/67
(S.D.N.Y.. filed Oct. 31, 1967) & Lockman v. New York City Housing Authrity, Civil No.
4414/67 (S.D.N.Y... filed Nov. 12, 1968), noted in 12 WELFARE L. BULL. 8 (1968);
NATIONAL CAPITAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, PROGRESS REPORT at 2 (1966) (on tenant concerns).
2N Such changes are not contained in the Low-RENT MANAGEMENT MANUAL'S statement
of what items shall be included in rent schedules. Low-RENT MANAGEMENT MANUAL. supra
note 22, § 3.3(e) (Oct. 1967).
2 E.g., Housing Authority of the Birmingham (Ala.) District, Dwelling Lease, HABD
No. 75, 2(e) (Feb. 1960); Chicago Housing Authority, Dwelling Lease, CHA 543 FR, 6
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tenant sector. While it is true that in the lease of private housing
the tenant may agree to pay for repairs necessitated by his own
negligence, this is only an affirmation of his common law liability
for waste .2 2 Such liability is determined by the judiciary in a civil
action rather than by the landlord. Private landlords do use the
security deposit device to insure payment at the termination of a
tenancy for damages resulting from tenant negligence or
destruction; 283 however, forfeiture of the security deposit is
unrelated to liability for rent and possible summary dispossession
of the tenant for failure to pay rent.Y
Furthermore, if repair charges, charges for key loans,
assessments for late payment and the like are added to and
considered to be rent, the final sum payable may exceed the
maximum permissible rent chargeable in relation to the tenant's
income. The inequity is compounded in cases where the damage
was not due to the tenant's fault or where fees for key loans or
other service charges bear no reasonable relationship to the cost of
the service provided. As a practical matter, the excess charge in
these cases can be characterized only as an increase in rent without
a concomitant increase in income.
Tenants' Remedies
The following relief would seem to be available to a tenant
whose rental liability has been increased by the tacking of repair
charges and other fees.
A Defense to eviction. Where a tenant is subjected to a
summary eviction proceeding based on his failure to pay rent, it
can be argued that the landlord is entitled to possession only if the
tenant is in arrears in rent. The tenant is not required to pay the
repair charge in order to maintain his possession.2 s5
(Jan. 1967); National Capital Housing Authority, Dwelling Lease, NCHA 583, 3(g)
(Aug. 1961).
=See note 309 infra.
10 Very often, however, private landlords cannot get such deposits from low income
tenants.
m The commission of waste can be a ground for the forfeiture of a lease. See generally
Annot., 3 A.L.R. 672 (1919). The decisions indicate, however, that to justify a forfeiture of a
tenant's term for waste the circumstances must show a "wanton disregard" of the lessor's
rights. E.g.. Klein v. Longo, 34 A.2d 359 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1943).
2 If the tenant has signed a lease clause whereby he has purportedly agreed to pay such
assessments as additional rent, the argument can be made that his consent was not an
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Requiring judicial determination of liability. A common
provision concerning liability for repairs is found in the Boston
Housing Authority Dwelling Lease in which the tenant supposedly
agrees "to pay when billed for any damage to any of the premises
or equipment of the Authority which the Authority shall determine
to have resulted directly or indirectly from causes within the
control of the Tenant or his family." It would seem elementary
that the Housing Authority cannot usurp the function of the
judiciary in determining liability for tenant-caused damage. If the
liability is based on contract 2 8-the terms of the lease-it could be
contended that it is contrary to public policy for a Local Authority
to set itself up, by contract, as the sole judge of a tenant's liability
and thus deprive him of the right to have his liability determined by
a court. Moreover, contractual liability in the absence of standards
or measures agreed upon by the parties is determined by a standard
of reasonableness. Since reasonableness is an issue for a court or
jury,.s 7 the tenant in these cases is entitled, at the very least, to a
judicial determinatidn of liability and the amount of damages. Even
where the tenant's liability for damage to the premises is based
upon an Authority's rule or regulation which may be nothing more
than a reaffirmation of a tenant's common-law or statutory
liability, for waste, the tenant is certainly entitled to a de novo
judicial review.2"
The penalty for late payment of rent is the only financial
sanction mentioned in the federal directives. The Low-Rent
Management Handbook, after indicating that the policy of
assessing penalties for late payment has met with varying success
among Local Authorities, advises that "only substantial penalties are
effective in improving rental collections."ss However, in terming
informed consent. For an argument that the lease is a contract of adhesion because many of
its terms, including this clause, were thrust upon the tenant by virtue of the Local Authority's
over-powering bargaining position, see notes 298-302 infra and accompanying text.
2" But cf notes 321-23 infra and accompanying text.
2See I A. CORBIN. CoNrRACrS § 99 (1963).
2- However, damages for waste are unrelated to liability for rent and require a separate
cause of action. In no case should separate liability for waste be the basis for a suit for
possession because of nonpayment of rent. Under modern pleading, counts asking damages
for waste and possession because of nonpayment of rent may be joined in the same
complaint; however, they would require separate allegations and different proof. See, e.g..
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1109 to 11 (1967).
2 LOCAL Ab-rHorRTv HANDBOOK, supra note 24, Pt. 11. § 4. 10 (Aug. 1961).
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the charge for late payment as a penalty and indicating the
effectiveness of large penalties, the Handbook advocates a practice
of punitive measures which is in complete discord with anti-poverty
objectives and sound legal principles.
Attacks on fines as punitive and as contrary to the legislative
purpose. The Housing Act provides that "rents shall be fixed by the
public housing agency and approved by the [Secretary of HUD]
after taking into consideration (a) the family size, composition, age,
physical handicaps, and other factors which might affect the rent-
paying ability of the family, and (b) the economic factors which
affect the financial stability and solvency of the project."210 The
rent schedules submitted for approval do not include charges such
as key loans or fines for rule infractions.9I The arbitrary inclusion
of additional charges as rent not only violates the statute, it defeats
the very purpose of the low-rent housing program.which was
designed to provide "decent, safe and sanitary dwellings within the
financial reach of families of low income." The fees or charges
exacted for late payment of rent,2 2. for a key loan,291 or for infraction
of rules and regulations29' are in excess of the cost or damages in-
curred by the Authority by reason of tbe breach. Such fees are de-
signed solely to prevent such infractions.295
If the assessment is characterized as damages for breach of
contract, it should be compensatory and not punitive in order to be
'"42 U.S.C . § 1402(1) (1964).
'"An argument could'be made that these charges iare within the "legal, economic, and
social factors" which the Local Authority may take.into consideration in fixing rents, See
LOCAL AUTHORITY HANDBOOIk, supra note 24, Pt..VII, § 2 (May 1964). However..
assuming arguendo the validity of the position, the charges usually have" no reasonable
relation to cost or damage and should not be used as revenue raising measures.
I These charges are often as high as $5. See PUBLIC HOUSING IS THE TENANTS. supra
note 7, at 33.
"I The amount varies not only from project to project but from tenant to tenant
depending on the favor the tenant holds with the project manager. E.g.. JOINT COMM. ON
PUBLIC HOUSING, supra note 256, at 18.
"I One NYCfHA tenant family was fined $5 because their child was riding a bicycle on a
project sidewalk, $2 for playing ball on a sidewalk, and $1 for walking on snow-covered
grass. Memorandum of Law in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at
8, Humphrey v. New York City Housing Authority, Civil No. 4236/67 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct.
31, 1967) & Lockman v. New York City Housing Authority, Civil No. 4414/67 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Nov. 12, 1968), noted in 12 WELFARE L. BULL. 8 (1968).
2,3 The LOCAL AUTHORITY HANDBOOK fosters this policy by indicating that "only
substantial penalties are effective in improving rental collections." Note 289 supra and
accompanying text.
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enforceable. However, the NYCHA Tenant Rules and Regulations
describe the fines as:
• . . liquidated damages, a reasonable charge imposed by the
Landlord, for extra services required by reason of the infraction by
the Tenant or any member of his family of requirements or rules
established for the proper administration of the project, the
protection of the Landlord's property or the safety and convenience
of other tenants 96
This provision is a contradiction in terms in that liquidated
damages are by definition fixed as to amount before any breach.
Furthermore, liquidated damages must have a reasonable relation
to the actual or probable loss.97
The alternative basis of tenant liability, tort damages, like that
for breach of contract, must be compensatory except in those few
areas where courts allow the award of punitive damages.
Adhesive nature of the leases. Many of these charges are not
specifically mentioned in the lease; rather the lease merely
incorporates by reference all the rules and regulations of the
Authority presently in effect and thereafter to be established! 8
Under strict contract law the tenant seems to have agreed to all the
Authority's rules and regulations. However, an examination of the
context .in which a public housing lease is executed reveals many
factors which should lead to judicial reluctance to enforce certain
of these lease provisions. Foremost, of course, is the fact that the
tenant has no voice in determining the terms of his lease since he is
most often unaware of, or confused by, its vague terms and
complicated clauses. He approaches the transaction with hat-in-
hand and, feeling that he is a fortunate recipient of a govermental
largess,"'9 is not disposed to question the terms of his tenancy as
dictated by the Authority. There is no opportunity for him to
negotiate the terms of his lease.m Many Authorities neither inform
2
" NEw YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, TENANT RULES AND REGULATIONS
(Sept. 1959).
2" Kothe v. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 226 (1930); 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1059
(1964); 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 779 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961).
2" But see I A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 95 (1963)..Any unilateral determinations must be
made in good faith and subject to some prescribed standard or implied limitations. Id.
2See Briar, Weljare From Below: Recipients' Views of the Public WelJare System, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 370, 374-77 (1966).
30 See notes 321-24 infra and accompanying text (discussion of adhesion contracts).
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the tenant of, nor make available to him, the incorporated rules
and regulations which comprise a substantial portion of his
agreement 0 ' Quite often he is not informed of rule changes or
additions made during his tenancy. In addition, uniform charges
for damages and extra services usually are not listed and no
procedure is provided for denying liability or challenging the
amount of the charge."' 2 Hopefully, courts confronted with the
inequities surrounding the .execution of public housing leases will
strike financial sanctions and other onerous clauses as an
unconscionable perversion of our national anti-poverty and housing
objectives.
Recommendations
Uniform, nation-wide regulation. In order to eliminate the great
diversity in managerial practices and to restrict the latitude and
power in operation presently vested in project managers H UD must
take a more active and direct role in the supervision of project
operations. A necessary first step toward this goal is the standardi-
zation of rules and regulations governing day-to-day project man-
agement. 03
It has been charged that project managers and other personnel,
who are property oriented by background and inclination, are
concerned primarily with the operation and maintenance of
physical property and are not attuned to the socio-legal rights and
demands of tenants.30 4 Since public housing should be heavily
committed to rehabilitating the dependent poor, the qualifications
and criteria of project managerial staffs should be reexamined and a
reorientation program instituted where necessary.3 s5 In addition,
31 See PUBLIC HOUSING Is THE TENANTS, supra note 7. at 31.
M82 In comparison, private landlords in a similar superior bargaining position have not
resorted to financial sanctions; nor do private leases customarily refer to rules and
regulations of the landlord in effect or to be subsequently enacted. The entire undertaking of
the tenant is encompassed by the lease; he need not look elsewhere to determine his
obligations. Id. The non-promulgation of rules raises another procedural due process issue.
See notes 213-25 supra and accompanying text.
34 Although it would be quite difficult for the federal authority to completely control the
caliber of management personnel, it could very easily implement specific guidelines to govern
their actions in the everyday administration of public housing.
4 See generally Friedman, supra note 4, at 654-56, 664-69.
One study has recommended that this re-orientation should include "an in-service
training program, and an outside educational program at a local college or university such
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federal guidelines as to qualifications and background for
employment should be promulgated to guide Local Authorities in the
selection of sociologically oriented and properly motivated
personnel.
This federal formalization of internal procedures and practices
should be carried out with a view to enlarging the self-respect and
dignity of tenants and minimizing the undue concern for physical
project property. To reach this goal the breadth of the regulations
should be substantially reduced. Supervision over tenants should at
least be limited to those areas commonly regulated by private
landlords and should be accompanied by uniform procedural rules
which will provide adequate safeguards for due process and review.
Increased tenant involvement. To ameliorate hostile
management-tenant relationships, to instill pride, dignity, and a
sense of self-determination in tenants, and to minimize arbitrary
and capricious management practices, tenants should be afforded
meaningful participation with management in everyday project
operation. 316 Tenant involvement can take several forms-for
example, the creation of separate tenant organizations to be
recognized as legitimate bargaining agents for tenants,37 tenant
participation with management officials on commissions which
would handle a myriad of operational tasks such as setting and
enforcing regulations, and acting on grievances concerning
management. Long-range plans should include the consideration of
alternatives to the present public housing program. The desirability
of centralized management can be seriously questioned. Among the
proposals being explored is the creation of small owning-managing
corporations eligible to receive subsidies conditioned upon specified
rental and operating policies. Perhaps rent subsidies or a
guaranteed annual income will provide a viable alternative to the
present programs. It has also been suggested that it might be less
expensive and more conducive to family responsibility if subsidies
were given for the purchase of family homes rather than for rentals.
A more moderate proposal is that the practice of forcing over-
as those provided to para-professional personnel in other community institutions." JOINT
COMM. ON PUBLIC HOUSING. supra note 256, at 22.
' See Dep't of Housing and Urban Development. Circular (Mar. 22, 1968).
3r See generally Comment, Tenant Unions: Legal Rights of Members, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REv. 358 (1969).
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income tenants out of public housing should be discontinued in
favor of permitting continued occupancy at slightly increased
rentals3 08
Elimination of financial sanctions. The arbitrary and unjust
system of assessing financial sanctions and collecting them as part
of rent must cease. An action for rent or for possessign based on
nonpayment of rent should be limited to that sum of money which
the tenant is required to pay based on his income pursuant to
established and approved rent schedules. Further, a tenant's
liability for repairs ought not be more than a private tenant's
responsibility, which is customarily limited to repairs indisputably
occasioned by active commission of waste or through negligence 9
In assessing charges adequate safeguards for due process and
appeal procedures Eire essential. If procedural safeguards are not
established the tenant must be afforded a trial de novo to determine
his liability and the reasonableness of the charge.
Other than liability for waste,. assessment of fees, fines, and
other financial sanctions should be abolished. These strictly penal
charges are not customarily assessed in private low-income housing
arrangements and are certainly incompatible with the objectives of
this nation's housing and poverty programs.
V. UNCONSCIONABLE CLAUSES IN PUBLIC HOUSING LEASES
The plethora of one-sided terms imposed on tenants in public
housing leases is symptomatic of the impervious attitude of Local
Authorities toward the public housing clientele. Public housing
leases, generally far more restrictive than those employed in the
private sector, take advantage of the poor and are designed to strip
the tenant of his rights and remedies. The shortage of decent low-
income private housing and public housing units in urban areas, the
Im Proposals of this nature are being considered by the National Housing Policy Forum.
PUBLIC HOUSING IS THE TENANTS, supra note 7, at 46-47.
m The traditional common law duty should be changed in one respect. The common law
recognized an implied duty on the part of the tenant to make minor repairs. This duty arose
from his duty not to commit waste. While this rule was fair in an agrarian society where the
repairs were simple and the necessary tools were close at hand, today the lessor is in a better
economic position to make repairs, and the tenant should be relieved of his common law
duty, absent a specific covenant. The common law rule has been changed by statute in a
number of jurisdictions through the enactment of housing codes and other public health and
safety statures. I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.78 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
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impossibility of negotiating terms and the voluminous forms and
application blanks of a massive bureaucracy all serve to give the
Local Authority an overwhelming amount of bargaining power.
Federal and state enabling legislation and the ACC are silent as
to the contents of public housing leases. The Low-Rent
Management Handbook merely comments that, in addition to the
standard landlord-tenant obligations, the public housing lease must
require the tenant to report changes in income or status and agree
to rental increases based on such changes. The Local Authorities,
however, have seized on the Handbook recommendation that the
lease be from month to month 10 as a license to gear the lease in
their favor.
The following examples of the types of clauses found in public
housing leases demonstrate the onerous terms imposed by the Local
Authorities. Public housing leases create, at most, month-to-month
tenancies. The tenancies are usually of even shorter duration
because a month-to-month tenancy requires thirty day's notice to
terminate whereas most public housing tenancies can be terminated
on lesser notice. A fifteen-day notice requirement is most common;
however, at least one Authority provides for a period of only ten
days.311 The tenant must often agree to waive even the limited
notice described above upon the breach of any clause or condition
in the lease or upon the termination of the lease. The clause
containing this provision also grants to management "all rights
and privileges accorded by law for the purpose and to the end of
obtaining immediate possession of the said premises.1 312
Richardson v. Housing Authority"13 -focused on a lease provision
compelling a female tenant to waive her right to all notices required
by law and all legal proceedings to recover possession if she gave
birth to an illegitimate child. This same waiver of the right to
possession "without legal notice or the institution of any legal
3'0 PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION. LOCAL HOUSING AUTHORITY MANAGEMENT
HANDBOOK Pt. IV. § 6, (d)(1) (July 1965).
3" E.g.. Housing Authority of the Birmingham (Ala.) District, Dwelling Lease, HABD
no. 75, F 1(c) (Feb. 1960); Housing Authority of New Orleans, Dwelling Lease. Form D-
104 (May I. 1960).
31 E.g.. Housing Authority of New Orelans, Dwelling Lease, Form D-104, T 3 (May I,
1960).
3'3 Civil No. 678 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 1968) (consent order).
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proceedings whatsoever" takes effect in some leases at the moment
the tenant's income exceeds maximum limits.3 4
Public housing leases generally contain provisions requiring the
tenant to pay the Authority's costs and attorney's fees in
connection with any legal proceedings against the tenant.315
Moreover, cognovit clauses concerned with collection procedures
generally deny the tenant's basic legal and constitutional rights in
providing for a confession of judgment, waiver of service of process
and trial by jury, and consent to immediate execution.
In violation of the Handbook, exculpatory clauses immunize the
Authority from liability for personal injuries to the tenant or
damage to his property t6 The Authorities also attempt through
these leases to disclaim liability for failure to provide basic services
and utilities,3t7 and to shift the duty of repair to the tenant. All
leases enumerate various. obligations and liabilities and then
designate the Authority as the sole judge of whether the tenant has
committed any prohibited acts.
The tenant may also be forced to relinquish ownership of
personal property left on the premises when he vacates..3 18
Furthermore, despite the Gwinn Amendment cases,31 9 clauses can
still be found conditioning occupancy in public housing on non-
membership in subversive organizations.
*" E.g.. Housing Authority of New Orleans, Dwelling Lease, Form D-104 (May I, 1960).
" A recent New York statute provides that if a lease of residential property contains a
provision that the landlord may recover attorney's fees and expenses incurred as a result of
the tenant's failure to perform any covenant in the lease, there shall also be an implied
covenant by the landlord to pay the tenant attorney's fees and expenses incurred as a result
of the landlord's failure to perform any covenant or in the successful defense of any action
by the landlord. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 234 (McKinney 1967).
3" See Thomas v. Housing Authority, 71 Wash. 2d 69, 70-71, 426 P.2d 836, 837 (1967);
Housing Authority of the Birmingham (Ala.) District, Dwelling Lease, HABD no. 75, ' 4
(Feb. 1960); Boston Housing Authority, Dwelling Lease, Conditions of Occupancy, no. 28;
National Capital Housing Authority, Dwelling Lease, NCHA 583, 3(j) (Aug. 1961).
317 See Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority, Dwelling Lease, CMHA 8-4W. r B(3)
(Nov. 1961); Housing Authority of New Orleans, Dwelling Lease, Form D-104, C 2 (May
1, 1960); Housing Authority of the City and County of San Francisco, Dwelling Lease, AC
65 (Feb. I, 1965).
319 See Housing Authority of the Birmingham (Ala.) District, Dwelling Lease, HABD No.
75, Conditions of Occupancy, no. 13 (Feb. 1960). The general common law rule is that the
tenant does not forfeit title to his personal property by failing to remove it after the
expiration of the lease, even if he fails to do so within a reasonable time. 32 Am. JUR.
Landlord and Tenant § 842 (1941).
*1, See notes 344-47 infra and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the most humiliating waiver a tenant must make is that
of his "right of privacy." Many leases require the tenant to submit
to a search of his dwelling at any time for almost any reason. Such
clauses requiring consent to searches without a search warrant or
even probable cause are of doubtful validity 2
Contracts o] Adhesion
The public housing lease is the epitome of a contract of
adhesion-an agreement "in which one party's participation
consists in his mere adherence, unwilling and often unknowing, to a
document drafted unilaterally and insisted upon by what is usually
a powerful enterprise. 32'
Courts have stricken burdensome clauses in various types of
contracts when acceptance by one of the parties was unavoidable
because of circumstances surrounding the negotiation and execution
of the contractY2 An argument has been made that all the elements
of an adhesion contract exist in the lease of private slum property
to an indigent tenant02 This argument applies with greater force in
the case of the public housing lease. Lease clauses are fairly
standardized throughout the Authorities because the Authorities are
the draftsmen. Provisions such as those listed above are patently
beneficial only to the Authority which is in a more dominant
position than the private landlord. An applicant for public housing
has no choice but to adhere to the dictated terms; if he objects he
remains in, or is relegated to, private slum housing.
Although take-it-or-leave-it behavior has continued to flourish
in the private sector under the guise of freedom of contract, the
public housing lease must be examined not as a bargained-for
contract but as a set of rules and conditions laid down by the Local
Authority. Each clause must be scrutinized in the light of legislative
policy. When so viewed the incompatibility of these conditions with
31 See also Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n. 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr.
623 (1967) (welfare benefits may not be conditioned upon the recipient's consent to
unconstitutional searchesy Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act.
72 YALE L.J. 1347, 1348-50 (1963).
3 Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072, 1075
(1953).
' See. e.g.. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358. 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
*3 Schoshinski, supra note 64, at 555.
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the basic purposes of the low-income housing program becomes
obvious. These harsh terms certainly cannot be rationalized as
promoting the legislative purposes of alleviating oppressive slum
conditions and providing a "suitable living environment" for all.
Courts have mitigated the severity of adhesion contracts in
several ways.32 4 In the case of the public housing lease the
appropriate relief would be a declaration that the unconscionable
conditions are null and void.
Attacks on Exculpatory Clauses
The Low-Rent Management Handbook expressly prohibits any
attempt by Local Authorities to disclaim liability for their
negligence.P Exculpatory provisions of this nature contradict the
enunciated public policy of several states"' as well as the stated
federal purpose of providing "decent, safe and sanitary dwellings
for families of low income. ' ' 327 The policy of freedom of contract
should not be enforced against the public housing tenant who,
lacking any bargaining power, is the alleged beneficiary of state
legislation arid local housing regulations which impose duties of
safe maintenance on the landlord. Such exculpatory attempts have
met with judicial and statutory disapproval in the private sector.22
Attempts by Local Authorities to shift statutory obligations of
repair and maintenance to the impecunious tenant contravene
public policy and federal housing legislation as do disclaimers of
liability for failure to supply heat, water, and electricity "for any
cause whatsoever. ' 329 The Supreme Court of Washington has held
that a clause exculpating a Local Authority from liability for
personal injuries of a tenant, arising from "any existing or future
condition" or "defect" in the premises, is void as violative of
public policy. The court founded its decision on the Authority's
"public duty" and on the great inequality of bargaining power
31 Id. at 556.
3'3 PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, LOCAL HOUSING AUTHORITY MANAGEMENT
HANDBOOK Pt. IV, § I, 6. (d)(2) (July 1965).
a' E.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-321 (McKinney 1964).
42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
3n See Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941); 3175 Holding Corp. v.
Schmidt, 150 Misc. 853, 270 N.Y.S. 663 (Mun. Ct. N.Y. 1934); Boyd v. Smith, 372 Pa.
306, 94 A.2d 44 (1953).
n See note 317 supra and accompanying text.
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between the Authority and the tenant. 03 A sympathetic court would
have little difficulty in also finding that such disclaimers destroy
the mutuality of the parties' obligations.3' A recent well-reasoned
decision332 recognized that a dwelling lease is a contract, and as
such it "must always be most strongly construed against the party
who prepared it, particularly where the other party has no voice in
its terms." 33
Waiver of Statutory Remedies
Public housing leases are replete with "waivers" by the tenant
of rights, privileges, exemptions, an.d remedies which would
otherwise be accorded him by law. Although courts sometimes will
sanction such waivers in freely negotiated contracts between private
parties, a strong argument can be made that these attempted
waivers are inoperative for the reason stated by Professor Corbin:
It is obvious that when a right, a privilege, or a defense is
conferred upon an individual by law, it is conferred upon him
because it is believed to be in the public interest to do so. In many
such cases it is believed to be contrary to the public interest to
permit him to waive or to bargain away the right, privilege, or
defense; and when it is so believed the attempted waiver or bargain
is inoperative.3
Waivers should not be accorded the traditional judicial sanction
when they appear in public housing agreements because they are
not the result of a freely negotiated, arm's-length bargain between
two private parties of relatively equal contractual power. The
extortion of basic legal rights by a federally-funded, state-created,
and locally administered public housing authority raises serious
constitutional questions.3 6
Even if such protections can be waived, execution of the lease
may not be a free and knowing waiver of tenant rights. If
mThomas v. Housing Authority, 71 Wash. 2d 69, 76-80, 426 P.2d 836. 841-43 (1967),
noted in 44 WASH. L. REV. 498 (1969). For a similar early holding, see Housing Authority
v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557,-14 So.2d 527 (1943).
"' See I A. CORBI.N. CONTRACTS. § 16, at 36-37 (1963).
United States v. Blakney, Civil No. L&T 90300 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess.. July 29. 1966).
Id. at 2.
aSee generall. 6A A. CORBIN. CONTRACTS. § 515, at 727-33 (1962).
Id. at 728.
See notes 346-47 infra And accompanying text.
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covenants in public housing leases constitute a waiver of rights
given to a tenant by statute, an argument may still be made that
individuals should not be easily permitted to waive statutory
provisions enacted specifically for their protection.P
Confession of Judgment Clauses
A further illustration of the sweeping denial of legal protections
to public housing tenants is the confession of judgment clause
contained in the Chicago Housing Authority lease.38 Admittedly
such clauses are "legal" in Illinois,39 but resort to such devices by
public housing authorities is deplorable. They are peculiarly
inappropriate in a lease of any kind, and especially so in a public
housing lease.Y0
The public interest in protecting debtors in an inferior
bargaining position has led to the abolition of confession of
judgment agreements in many states.34' In other jurisdictions,
substantial limitations have been placed on their use.'2 In view of
this widespread antipathy toward confessions of judgment, their use
in public housing is appalling.
Authority As the Sole Judge of Tenant Conduct
Many leases attempt to establish the authority as the sole
arbiter of tenant liability. The lack of an expressed standard by which
liability is to be determined should render such clauses too
uncertain and indefinite for enforcement. 34 3 At the very least, a
standard of reasonableness should be implied and judicial
determination substituted for that of the Local Authority.
*1 "[A] statutory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may
not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy (citations
omitted). Where a private right is granted in the public interest to effectuate a legislative
policy, waiver of a right so charged or colored with the public interest will not be allowed
where it would thwart the legislative policy which it was designed to effectuate." Brooklin
Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945).
uSee note 281 supra.
.' ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 110, § 50 (1967). See Pyes, Reappraisal of the Confession of
Judgment Law. 48 ILL. BAR J. 764 (1960).
31 Note, Standard Form Leases in Wisconsin, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 583, 590.
31 For a listing of these states, see Note, Confessions of Judgment. 102 U. PA. L. Rev.
524 n.5 (1954).
u Id. at 525 n.6.
ul See I A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 393-410 (1963).
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Gwinn Amendment Clauses
Clauses in which the tenant warrants that he is not a member of
a "'subversive organization" and in which he "agrees" to vacate
should he become a member, were determined invalid more than a
decade ago.34 1 Such a clause imposes an unconstitutional
requirement as a condition of the tenancy because the tenant must
relinquish his constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech
and assembly.34 5 One Local Authority's imposition of such a
condition was held to be state action in violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 Legislatures or
government agencies may set up reasonable criteria for the
dispensation of a "privilege," but they cannot attach
unconstitutional conditions to its grant0Y
Recommendations
A model low-income lease must recognize and attempt to
further the goals of public housing. Public housing legislation is not
intended to protect landlords; its purpose is to aid indigent tenants
by providing them with a decent, safe environment at a rental they
can afford. Rather than fostering these ideals, however, current
leases restrict the rights of tenants and insulate the liability of their
landlords. To establish a cooperative management-tenant
relationship and to reflect the intent of public housing legislation,
leases must be based on three cardinal principles: clarity, brevity,
and mutuality of obligation.31
1. A necessary first step toward the creation of a more
equitable landlord-tenant relationship is the excision or'
amelioration of the unconscionable clauses discussed in this section.
The lease should take the form of a mutual contract with privileges
and obligations for both parties. 9
:"I See generally Williams, Tenant's Loyalty Oaths. 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 190 (1956);
Note, Denial of Federally Aided Housing to Members of Organizations on the Attorney
General's List. 69 HARv. L. REV. 551 (1956); Note, The Gwinn Amendment: Practical and
Constitutional Problems In Its Enforcement. 104 U. PA. L. REV. 694 (1956).
3n Cf. e.g.. Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d'51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Chicago Housing
Authority v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 (1964).
:I Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605, cert. denied. 350 U.S.
882 (1955).
34 See O'Neil, supra note 147.
See PUBaLc HOUSING IS THE TENANTS, supra note 7, at A-51-59.
31 An example of a private housing clause which adequately expresses mutuality of
obligation is the following:
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2. At present, and traditionally, leases are written in a form of
legalese which is baffling to laymen and unclear to many lawyers.
If a tenant is expected to accept his responsibilities under the lease,
he must first understand them; therefore, the lease terms should be
expressed in a clear, concise manner 0
3. If management's rules and regulations are not contained in
the lease, a copy of them should be furnished to the tenant when
the lease is signed. The tenant should be orally notified of the
presence of these rules, and the more important ones, such as
conditions of occupancy, should be explained to him.
VI. CONCLUSION
Born of a New Deal concern for those temporarily dispossessed
by the Depression, the American system of public housing has
found itself at the core of a new social context, including changes
in tenants and their expectations.35  Serious conflicts, which must be
resolved by the judiciary and the legislatures, have resulted from
these changes. The preceding discussion has reviewed four major
legal problems confronting public housing tenants: sub-standard
housing conditions, unreasonable admission and eviction standards,
unfair management practices, and unconscionable lease terms.
To the extent that sub-standard public housing is allowed to
stand, it is susceptible to the Supreme Court's indictment of
privately owned slums. "Miserable and disreputable housing
conditions may do more than spread disease and crime and
immorality. . . . They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the
community which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from
which men turn. ' '32
The landlord recognizes his continuing obligation to maintain this property. The landlord
agrees that he or his duly *appointed agent will inspect the premises subject of this
agreement at least twice yearly during daylight hours or by special appointment, to
note conditions and to arrange for the immediate correction of those conditions which
fall within the landlord's responsibility in accordance with this agreement. The tenant
hereby agrees to permit the inspection of these premises twice yearly and as well when
emergency requires, and to arrange and pay for the immediate correction of those
conditions which have been caused by his negligence or that of his invitees. The tenant
further agrees to notify the landlord of conditions which require corrections. FED.
BAR Assn, MODEL RENTAL AGREEMENT, 57 GEO. L.J. 480, 7 (1968).
30 See PUBLIC HOUSING IS THE TENANTS, supra note 7, at A-5 1-53.
" See Friedman, supra note 4, at 642-54.
' Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
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When tenants are subjected to unreasonable and irrelevant
standards for admission and eviction, the public housing system
perverts its reason for being. The care of those citizens who cannot
find shelter in the private sector should be the central motivation of
Local Authorities. When admission and eviction practices seek to
accomplish any other goal, they illegitimately discriminate against
the poor.
Unfair management practices and unconscionable lease terms
are cruel deceptions of those who are often without any effective
bargaining power. The inability of the poor to utilize the tools of
the marketplace is exacerbated when the power of the state lies
behind an inequitable contract. The misery arising from the
physical deficiences of many projects is aggravated by irrelevant
regulations .imposed by the management.
These injustices must be corrected if the public housing system
is to fulfill its promise of twenty years ago to the Nation's indigent.
It is no adequate defense to demonstrate that problems .have arisen
from changes in the social milieu. The requirements of the general
welfare have always been a function of social change.
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